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grade (K-12) bullying on the social and legislative agenda. Through their
efforts, society is beginning to understand the true nature of bullying and
the price that is paid by allowing it to remain unchecked. Unfortunately,
the same level of interest and attention has not been devoted to post-adolescent bullying, despite the continuing propensities of grade school and
high school bullies to torment others in college and later in the workplace. The tragedies at Virginia Tech and other college campuses periodically remind us of the issues involved, but a sustained dialogue has yet to
occur.
Perhaps one explanation for the low levels of concern and understanding of bullying at the college level is that historically colleges have
been largely immune from liability for their students' actions. This protection has given colleges and universities little motivation to address the
problem. Title IX signaled a shift towards holding schools liable for peeron-peer conduct-albeit gender-based-but very high standards make it a
near-illusory remedy. As society becomes more aware of and concerned
with post-adolescent bullying, colleges should anticipate a shift, whether
tort-based or otherwise, towards a greater risk of liability for peer-on-peer
conduct at the college level. Accordingly, colleges should begin implementing appropriate practices and policies to prevent bullying-related
harm to students and avoid the risk of liability.
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Confusion currently exists among college and university administrators about the legal liability risks their schools face due to bullying conduct. Stringent substantive requirements requiring actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference by school officials make Title IX and Section 1983
suits fruitless remedies to most injuries resulting from peer-on-peer conduct. Although some factual situations may be so egregious as to meet
these high standards, much of the bullying present on college campuses
or the institutions' responses will not rise to the level required by courts to
find liability. State civil rights statutes offer some hope for plaintiffs because they may have lower standards of proof compared to the federal
harassment statutes, but a gap remains between state and federal harassment statutes. Statutes that address bullying in schools fail to fill the gap
because they address only K-12 bullying and offer no private cause of action for victims of bullying. Without a private cause of action to provide
victims with a remedy in court, these anti-bullying statutes remain virtually
ineffective. In addition, each of the legal actions discussed above only addresses bullying based on a protected class but fails to address the broader
and more prolific bullying of those not belonging to a protected class.
Consequently, until more comprehensive bullying laws are passed, plaintiffs must rely on other tort or contract claims. Even those claims might
not help, however, because courts have traditionally defined duty, foreseeability, and causation in the student-university context in a manner that
insulates colleges from liability. A slight ray of hope for plaintiffs resides
in recent decisions, which indicate courts' growing willingness to reconceptualize the student-university relationship and hold universities and
colleges liable for student safety.
Regardless of legal liability, colleges should not ignore bullying on
campus because colleges' mission of providing a positive educational environment includes developing attitudes of tolerance in their students and
promoting public health. Campus responses must be multifaceted to include intervention, prevention, and enforcement components. An effective prevention component must be campus-wide, both systems-oriented
(restructuring the social environment of the college) and individual-oriented (addressing issues with individual students), and not time-limited.1
Studies show that a comprehensive approach to prevention can change
student behavior and attitudes.2 When designing such approaches, and
1. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Exploring the Nature and Prevention of Bullying:
Day 4-The Need For a Comprehensive Approach, http://www.ed.gov/admins/
lead/safety/training/bullying/bullying pg26.html.
2. SeeJAmEs A. Fox ET AL., BULLYING PREVENTION IS CRIME PREVENTION (2003),
available at http://www.fightcrime.org/sites/default/files/reports/Bullying
Report.pdf; Doug Toft, Owleus Bullying Prevention Program: One of the Most Effective
Tools to Prevent Bullying, HAZELDEN VOICE, Winter 2007, available at http://

www.hazelden.org/web/public/vc07olweus.page ("Six studies of the Olweus program involving over 40,000 students indicate 30%-70% reductions in reports of

bullying. These occurred along with significant reductions in vandalism, fighting,
theft, and truancy.").
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especially when drafting any type of anti-bullying policies, colleges must
pay careful attention to First Amendment constraints.
As a precursor to formulating a comprehensive response, colleges
must better understand the nature of bullying on campus. Part II of this
Article furthers this goal by defining bullying and exploring its prevalence
at all levels of education and the workforce, as well as detailing its detrimental effects on the bully, the victim, and bystanders. Next, Part III of
this Article reviews and analyzes the possible legal theories plaintiffs might
use to recover from a university or college after being bullied. Even
though substantial barriers currently exist to finding a college or university
liable for bullying conduct, this Article urges colleges and universities to
shield their students from bullying on campus to avoid the detrimental
impact that bullying has on campus culture and to minimize incidents of
campus violence. In Part IV, this Article concludes by exploring how colleges and universities can best protect themselves from legal liability and
maintain a safe and respectful learning and living environment for their
students.
II.

BULLYING AND ITS IMPACT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

A.

What Is Bullying?

A common problem with predicting when an institution of higher
education may be liable for bullying, as well as in enacting and implementing school anti-bullying policies, is assigning an appropriate definition to
bullying. Opponents of any type of legal response to bullying often cite
concerns of regulating protected speech or harmless conduct such as teasing or flirting. Such insults or banter, however, should not be confused
with or used as an excuse to condone or ignore true acts of bullying, which
need to be viewed as acts of school violence. To avoid ensnaring protected conduct and free speech, legislation, regulation, and policy must be
drafted carefully. Although multiple and varying definitions of bullying
exist, most definitions incorporate these four characteristics:
1. Bullying involves intentional, and largely unprovoked, efforts
to harm another.
2. Bullying can be physical or verbal and direct or indirect in
nature.
3. Bullying involves repeated negative actions by one or more
persons against another.
4. Bullying, unlike teasing, centers upon an imbalance of physical
3
or psychological power.
3. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., Exploring the Nature and Prevention of Bullying:
Day 1-Bullying Myths and Facts, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/training/bullying/bullying-pg3.html (last visited May 17, 2010). Commentators have
defined bullying as "the willful, conscious desire to hurt or threaten or frighten
someone else." See MARGARET JOHNSTONE ET AL., AcrION AGAINST BULLYING
(1991). Bullying is repeated oppression, psychological or physical, of a less power-
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Bullying also becomes difficult to discuss because it can incorporate
many behaviors that span a continuum of severity, including physical bullying (punching, poking, strangling, hair pulling, beating, biting, inappropriate touching, and excessive tickling), emotional bullying (rejecting,
extorting, defaming, humiliating, blackmailing, manipulating friends, isolating, ostracizing, and peer pressure), sexual bullying (exhibitionism,
voyeurism, sexual propositioning, sexual harassment, and abuse involving
physical contact and assault), and verbal bullying (hurtful name-calling,
teasing, and gossip). 4 Also, individuals or groups can perpetrate bullying.
A college's proper response and potential liability will necessarily depend
on the extent and nature of the bullying, as these behaviors differ in their
level of severity, with some even being illegal. Nonetheless, ignoring any
of the behaviors can be dangerous because the less serious actions may
easily escalate to more severe behavior.
B.

Bullying Is a Real and Serious Problem

Bullying is a pervasive problem in schools. Studies in the United
States estimate that 30% of youths (5.7 million) were a bully, a target of
bullying, or both.5 According to the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development's (NICHD) 1998 survey of youths in grades six
through ten, 3.2 million students reported that they were victims of bullying and 3.7 million students reported that they bullied others.6 Other
countries have similar survey results, with some countries reporting even
higher rates of bullying incidents. 7 Some studies indicate bullying usually
"begins in elementary school, peaks in middle school, and diminishes but
does not disappear in high school." 8
Although bullying continues into high school and college, much of
this behavior goes unreported. One likely explanation may be that bullying continues across all ages, but the type of bullying changes from physical bullying to sexual or emotional bullying, which is more difficult to
ful person by a more powerful person or group of persons. See David P. Farrington, Understandingand PreventingBullying, 17 CRIME &JUST. 381 (1993). For many
more definitions, see U.S. Dep't of Educ., Exploring the Nature and Prevention of
Bullying: Other Definitions of Bullying, http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/
training/bullying/bullying pg4.html#definitions (last visited May 17, 2010). Contrast these definitions to teasing when students have equal physical or psychological power and usually are friends who remain friends. See Dr. Dorothy Espelage,
Bullying: An Old Problem Gets New Attention, TEX. CLASSROoM TCHRs. AsS'N, http://
www.tcta.org/edmatters/trouble/bullying.htm (last visited May 17, 2010).
4. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
5. See National Youth Violence Prevention Resource Center, Bullying Facts
and Statistics, http://www.safeyouth.org/scripts/faq/bullying.asp (last visited Nov.
8, 2009).
6. U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
7. See Fox ET AL., supra note 2; U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
8. See, e.g., Bullying, ISSUE BRIEF (Maine Legislative Youth Advisory Council,

Augusta, Me.), Oct. 3, 2006, at 2, available at http://maine.gov/legis/opla/
lyacbullybrief.pdf.
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detect and is often more harmful and disruptive to learning.9 Another
likely factor contributing to underreporting of bullying in high school and
college is the transition from children living under their parents' care and
supervision to living "on their own." Likewise, once in the work force,
victims of bullying have their employer or supervisor to turn to in addressing such incidents and may do so if work performance is compromised as
a result of bullying. A college student entering into a new phase of independence is less likely to know who to turn to with regard to personal
confrontations with a peer student.
Hardly an adolescent issue, bullying continues to be a major problem
in the workplace. 10 Studies find that bullying occurs frequently in the
workplace and is among the fastest growing complaints of American workers." A 2007 U.S. Workplace Bullying Survey found workplace bullying to
be an epidemic, with fifty-four million people-amounting to 37% of
12
American workers-who have reported being the victims of bullying.
Workplace bullying, like bullying in educational settings, results in victims
reporting a decrease in productivity due to efforts to avoid the bully or
worrying about the situation.13 A substantial number of bullied workers,
46%, consider changing jobs and 12% actually change jobs as a result of
being bullied. 14
At least one court has taken notice of this type of bullying and considered expert testimony about workplace bullying at trial. In a recent case,
the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a $325,000 verdict for assault brought
by an operating room perfusionist (a person who operates the heart/lung
machine during open heart surgeries) against a cardiovascular surgeon,
5
who the perfunctionist claimed behaved as a workplace bully.1 The bullying that gave rise to the assault claim occurred when the surgeon, angry
over the perfusionist's complaints to hospital administration regarding the
surgeon's treatment of other perfusionists, "aggressively and rapidly advanced on the plaintiff with clenched fists, piercing eyes, beet-red face,
6
popping veins, and scream[ed] and sw[ore] at him."' The surgeon argued that the jury's award on the assault claim was unfairly influenced by
9. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.
10. See Mogens Arervold, Bullying at Work: A Discussion of Definitions and Prevalence, Based on an Empirical Study, 48 SCANDANAVIAN

J.

PSYCHOL. 161 (2007); R.A.

Baron &J. H. Neuman, Workplace Aggression-The Iceberg Beneath the Tip of Workplace
Violence: Evidence on Its Forms, Frequency and Targets, 21 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 446 (1998).

For more articles on this subject, see New York Healthy Workplace Advocates,

www.nyhwa.org/4.html (last visited May 17, 2010).
11. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination:Toward a PluralisticUnderstanding of Workplace Harassment,88 GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (1999).
12. See WORKPLACE BULLYING INSr. & ZOGBY INT'L, U.S. WORKPLACE BULLYING
SURVEY

(2007),

available at http://www.workplacebullying.org/res/N-N-Zogby

2007.pdf.
13. See Ehrenreich, supra note 11, at n.238.
14. See id.
15. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. 2008).
16. Id. at 794.
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expert testimony that labeled the surgeon's behavior "workplace bullying."' 7 Among other alleged errors, the surgeon complained that the trial
court should have instructed the jury that the phrase "workplace bully" was
irrelevant to the perfusionist's claims and that workplace bullying is not
against the law.' 8 The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
workplace bullying could be considered a form of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and, therefore, the trial court properly admitted the
expert testimony concerning workplace bullying.' 9
Although bullying is a well-documented problem in K-12 schools and
in the workforce, relatively little research exists concerning bullying in
postsecondary settings. Anecdotally, a growing concern among college
and graduate school professors is the perceived increase in student "incivility, insubordination, and intimidation."2 0 Students not only perform
physically violent acts, such as the recent mass murders at colleges, but
also engage in verbal abuse directed towards professors and classmates. 2 '
The Internet provides a readily available venue for students to bully, and
several articles have been written recently on the phenomenon of cyberbullying.2 2 Law enforcement officials have even advised some colleges to
adopt policies and devote resources to this problem.2 3
Confirming educators' growing concern about the problem of bullying, two recent studies specific to college-age students indicate that bullying is not limited to younger age groups. The first study surveyed 1,025
undergraduate students. 24 Of that group, 33.4% reported witnessing a
student bully another student in college once or twice. 25 An additional
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 795-96.
See id. at 798.
See id. at 799.
See Helen Smith et al., Violence on Campus: PracticalRecommendations for Le-

gal Educators (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 21, 2008) (citing

GERALD AMADA, COPING WITH THE DISRUPTIVE COLLEGE STUDENT (1999)), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981497 .
21. See id. (quoting Alison Schneider, Insubordination and Intimidation Signal
the End of Decorum in Many Classrooms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar.
27, 1998, at A12.
22. See, e.g., Juicy Campus, wwwjuicycampus.com; Kevin P. Brady & Kathleen
Conn, Bullying Without Borders: The Rise of Cyberbullying in America's Schools, Scri. Bus.
AFFAIRS 6, 8 (Oct. 2006); Press Release, Anne Milgram, N.J. Attorney Gen., Attor-

ney General Advises College Students to Be Alert to Cyber-Bullies and Sexual

Predators on the Internet (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases08/pr20080826a.html; Alberto D. Morales, First Amendment Groups
Warn N.J. Attorney General of Broad 'Cyberbulling' Definition, STUDENT PREss L.
CENTER, Nov. 10, 2008, http://splc.org/newsflash-archives.asp?id=1831 &year=
2008. Although since closed, Juicy Campus was a popular website among college
students where they could post all types of anonymous gossip making it an ideal
platform for bullies to harass their victims.
23. See Press Release, supra note 22.
24. See Mark Chapell, Bullying in College by Students and Teachers, 39 ADOLEsCENCE 53, 56 (2004).
25. See id. at 58.
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24.7% reported seeing bullying occur occasionally and 2.8% reported seeing it very frequently. 26 Although slightly lower, over 40% of respondents
reported seeing a teacher bully a student compared to over 60% seeing
student-on-student bullying.27 These responses are consistent with bullying in the workplace and confirm that bullying is likewise a fairly common
problem in college. Indeed, to think that bullying begins in K-12, stops in
college, and then begins again in the workplace defies common sense.
A 2006 study confirmed that although bullying does decrease as students matriculate, it does not stop.2 8 In addition, college students were
more likely to be bullied if they had been bullied in elementary or high
school.29 Interestingly, unlike bullying in high school, the study reported
that no significant sex differences existed as to which gender was more
likely to be bullied in college, though the type of bullying experienced by
males differed from that experienced by females. 3 0 In particular, males
were bullied physically and verbally more than female students, who engaged in indirect or social bullying. 3 ' Finally, the study indicated that
teachers and coaches primarily used verbal bullying followed in prevalence by social bullying, while two students reported physical bullying by
their coaches.3 2
Another rich source of data on college bullying is research exploring
bullying of college students who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT), as well as bullying that occurs during hazing of students
who are initiated into some larger group. A recent National Gay and Lesbian Task Force report found that 20% of the respondents feared for their
safety on campus and 36% of LGBT undergraduates experienced harassment within the past year.33 To avoid intimidation, over half of the respondents concealed their sexual identity from their classmates. Although
some respondents felt the university offered positive environments in
which to work and attend class, many respondents still found their campuses hostile and homophobic.
Likewise, hazing continues to be a major problem facing universities.
Accurate numbers are often difficult to ascertain because of underreporting. One study indicated that 95% of the hazing incidents identified by
26. See id.
27. See id. at 59.
28. See Mark S. Chapell et al., Bullying in Elementary, High School and College, 41
ADOLESCENCE 633, 633-34 (2006).
29. See id. at 642.
30. See id. at 643.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 641.
33. See SUsAN R. RANKIN, THE POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN
TASK FORCE, CAMPUS CLIMATE FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER PEO-

PLE: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2003), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/

downloads/reports/reports/CampusClimate.pdf.
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students were not reported to campus officials. 34 Despite students' reluctance to report incidents, it is clear that a large number of them are being
hazed.3 5 In a recent report from a national study on student hazing, 55%
of college students involved in clubs, teams, and organizations experience
hazing.3 6 These hazing experiences take many forms, from degrading an
individual, physical intimidation, making prank calls, or harassing others,
to drinking large amounts of alcoholic or non-alcoholic liquids that endanger a person's safety.
C.

Why Should Colleges and Universities Be Concerned with Bullies?

Colleges and universities combating school violence should be concerned with bullying because bullying is a form of school violence and
often leads to more severe acts of school violence. Unfortunately, most
administrators narrowly define school violence as incidents involving personal injuries such as school shootings. Instead, a better definition of
school violence would be "any behavior that violates a school's educational
mission or climate of respect or jeopardizes the intent of the school to be
free of aggression against persons or property, drugs, weapons, disruptions, and disorder."3 7 This definition is not limited to a safe school setting and also focuses on providing an appropriate learning environment.
Focusing on physical security measures alone such as keeping guns off
of campus will never solve the school violence problem. Schools also must
address underlying causes of high-profile violent incidents that often have
roots in bullying behavior. Bullying behavior should serve as a warning
sign to campus administrators because of its potential to escalate and lead
to other more serious types of campus violence such as "rape, assault,
fighting, hazing, dating violence, sexual harassment, hate and bias-related
violence,"3 8 or even "stalking, rioting, disorderly conduct, property crime,
and even self-harm and suicide." 39
Although bullying may be at the lower end of the spectrum of school
violence, bullying harms the campus climate by producing detrimental
34.

J.

See ELIZABETH ALLAN & MARY MADDEN, HAZING IN VIEW: COLLEGE STUDENTS AT RISK, INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL STUDY OF STUDENT HAZING

(2008), http://www.hazingstudy.org/publications/hazing-in-viewweb.pdf.
35. See Florence L. Denmark et al., Bullying and Hazing: A Form of Campus Harassment, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAMPUS VIOLENCE 27, 30 (Michele A.

Paludi ed., 2008).
36. See ALLAN &

MADDEN, supra note 34.
37. just What Is "School Violence"?, NEWS BRIEF (Ctr. for the Prevention of Sch.

Violence, N.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Raleigh,
N.C.), May 2002, http://www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/pdf-files/newsbrief5_02.pdf.
38. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIMES ON CAMPUS: THE PROBLEM AND EFFORTS TO CONFRONT IT (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bja/
187249.pdf.

39.

LINDA LANGFORD, THE HIGHER EDUC. CTR. FOR ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG
ABUSE AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION, PREVENTING VIOLENCE AND PROMOTING SAFETY IN
HIGHER EDUCATION SETTINGS

pubs/violence.html.
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long-term and short-term effects on the victim, the bully, and the bystander. Not only do victims of bullying suffer physical ramifications such
as headaches, stomach aches, weight loss, vomiting, and general poor
health, 4 0 but victims also suffer psychological effects such as depression,
loss of concentration, anxiety, and insomnia.4 ' These conditions impact
both academic achievement and the mental health of the victim.4 2 For
example, some studies find that victims of bullying perform below average

40. SeeJoseph A. Dake et al., The Nature and Extent of Bullying at School, 73 J.
ScH. HEALTH 173 (2003) (finding one study that concluded that victims were 4.6
times more likely and bullies 5.1 times more likely to experience psychosomatic
symptoms than students not involved in bullying; these symptoms included low
back pain, neck and shoulder pain, stomach ache, nervousness, irritation or tantrums, difficulty sleeping or waking, fatigue, and headache); R. Kaltiala-Heino et
al., Bullying at School-An Indicatorof Adolescents at Risk for Mental Disorders, 23 J.
ADOLESCENCE 661 (2000) (illustrating that psychosomatic health issues, such as
poor appetite and anxiety, are also more common among victims and bully/victims); Ken Rigby, Peer Victimisation at School and the Health of Secondary School Students, 69 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 95 (1999); Katrina Williams et al., Association of
Common Health Symptoms with Bullying in Primary School Children, 313 BlT. MED.J. 17
(1996) (finding that victimized children have been found to experience more frequent stomach aches and headaches, and to be more likely to have troubles with
sleeping and bed wetting); D. Wolke et al., Bullying Involvement in Primary School and
Common Health Problems, 85 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 197 (2001), available at http://adc.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/85/3/197.pdf (concluding that victims of
bullying and bully/victims are most likely to present physical health symptoms
such as sore throats, colds, and cough).
41. See Dake et al., supra note 40 (finding that (1) bullies are 2.8 to 4.3 times
more likely, victims four times more likely, and bully/victims 6.3 to 8.8 times more
likely to suffer from depressive symptoms than children not involved in bullying;
and (2) that bullies are four times more likely, victims 2.1 times more likely, and
bully/victims 2.5 times more likely to report having serious thoughts of suicide);
Kirsti Kumpulainen & Eila Rasanen, Children Involved in Bullying at Elementary School
Age: Their Psychiatric Symptoms and Deviance in Adolescence: An Epidemiological Sample,
24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLEcr 1567 (2000) (finding that children involved in bullying at early age have been found to have more psychiatric symptoms in adolescence than youth not involved in bullying); see also Addressing the Problem ofJuvenile
Bullying, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION FACT SHEET
(U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Wash., D.C.), June 2001, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/ojjdp/fs200127.pdf (describing that short-term psychological effects on
victims include increased feelings of loneliness, loss of self-esteem, and difficulties
making friends or maintaining relationships with classmates, and that victims may
also suffer humiliation, insecurity, and fear of attending school).
42. SeeJaanaJuvonen et al., Peer Harassment,PsychologicalAdjustment, and School
Functioningin Early Adolescence, 92 J. EDuc. PSYCHOL. 349 (2000) (examining grade
point averages of victimized students ages twelve to fifteen and finding them to be
lower than those of middle school students not involved in bullying, and noting
that bullying at school is also related to academic competence and school adjustment, although research findings in this area do not always agree); David Schwartz
et al., The Emergence of Chronic Peer Victimization in Boys' Play Groups, 64 CHILD DEV.
1755 (1993) (noting that results are consistent with conclusion of study involving
U.S. children of nearly same age, which found that victims and bullies showed
lower academic competence, whereas study by Schwartz found that students who
were bully/victims had lower academic competence on same scale as bullies).
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in school and below students who are not subjected to bullying.4 3 Victims
may also try to avoid contact with the bully by changing their everyday
routines, avoiding the classroom or other school facilities, and in some
extremes, even withdrawing from college. In addition to withdrawal and
social isolation, victims may engage in negative or harmful conduct such as
acting more aggressively, turning to alcohol or drugs, or even committing

suicide. 4 4
Victims may also resort to physical violence in response to persistent
bullying. For example, reports from students indicated the Virginia Tech
gunman was bullied."5 Though these horrific incidents are relatively rare,
universities should not overlook the more common experience of being
bullied as a very real precursor to campus violence."6 Colleges that ignore
43. See Helen Mynard & Stephen Joseph, Bully/victim Problems and Their Association with Eysenck's PersonalityDimensions in 8 to 13 Year Olds, BuT. J. EDUC PSYCHOL.
1997 (1993) (finding that both bullies and victims did worse in school than chil-

dren not involved in bullying, and that victims were affected more than bullies);
Tonja R. Nansel et al., Relationships Between Bullying and Violence Among U.S. Youth,
157 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 348, 348 (2003), available at http:
//archpedi.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/157/4/348?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=
I0&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=Relationships+Between+Bullying+and+Violence+
Among+U.S.+Youth&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
(highlighting that although researchers did not find significant relationship between
academic achievement and bullying victimization, they did discover that bully/victims had poorer scholastic competence than students not involved in bullying, and
that bullies were 1.8 times more likely to be below average students as they were to
be good students).
44. See Marcel F. van der Wal et al., PsychosocialHealth Among Young Victims and
Offenders of Direct and Indirect Bullying, 111 PEDIATRICS 1312 (2003) (indicating that
depression and thoughts of committing suicide are much more common among

boys and girls who have been bullied than among those who have not); see alo
Kaltiala-Heino et al., supra note 40 (commenting that frequent consumption of
alcohol and use of other controlled substances are more common among bullies
and bully/victims). But see Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among US
Youth: Prevalanceand Association with PsychosocialAdjustment, 285 JAMA 2094 (2001)
(finding that alcohol use was positively associated with bullying others, but negatively associated with being bullied, and finding that smoking was found to be
more common among both bullies and bully/victims).
45. See Posting of Amanda Phillips to The Depravity Scale, https://depravityscale.org/blog/?p=19 (June 1, 2007, 20:11 EST). Experts caution against profiling
because there have been so few murder rampages on campuses, so it is difficult to
make any conclusions about likely perpetrators. See Sheldon F. Greenberg, Active
Shooters on College Campuses: Conflicting Advice, Roles of the Individual and First Responder, and the Need to Maintain Perspective, DISASTER MED. & PUB. HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS, June 28, 2007, http://www.dmphp.org/cgi/content/full/1/
Supplement_1/S57#R9-17. However, studies about secondary school shootings do

support the proposition that bullying contributes to the perpetrator's violent behavior. For discussion of these studies, see infra note 46.
46. See U.S. SECRET SERV. NAT'L THREAT ASSESSMENT CTR., SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE: AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED VIOLENCE IN SCHOOL
(2000), available at http://cecp.air.org/download/ntac-ssi-report.pdf (noting
that bullying also seems to have been contributing factor in many mass school
shootings). The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center examined

thirty-seven school shootings in the United States, and found that bullying played a
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bullying on campus help create an environment ripe for tragedy like the
one at Virginia Tech.
The victim is not the only one to experience negative effects from
bullying. Hazing research illustrates that some bullies suffer guilt, shame,
and discomfort after a bullying incident in which they act in a manner that
7
Moreover, bullies may also suffer deis inconsistent with their values.4
pression and suicidal ideation, though the cause of these symptoms may
48
Bullies are more likely to enbe the result of having also been bullied.
gage in unlawful and/or violent behavior as children and later as adults
than their non-bullying peers.49 For example, a NICHD survey found that
"approximately 60 percent of boys who were classified by researchers as
bullies in grades six through nine were convicted of at least one crime by
the age of 24, compared to only 23 percent of the boys who were not
50
Of those classified as bullies, 40%
characterized as bullies or victims."
had three or more convictions by age twenty-four, compared to 10% of
51
Several other studies report
those who were neither victims nor bullies.
52
more frequent delinquent behavior among bullying offenders.
53
The negative effects of bullying are also widely felt by bystanders.
Bystanders witness the bullying and often for various reasons fail to intervene. 5 4 This failure causes different forms of distress for the individual
key role in two-thirds of these incidents. See id. A number of these attackers had
gone through harsh, long-term bullying, and their experiences seemed to be a
major motivation behind the attacks. See id.
47. See Denmark et al., supra note 35, at 35.
48. See van der Wal et al., supra note 44, at 1316.
49. See Nansel et al., supranote 43, at 348 (referencing significant quantity of
research examining link between bullying and violent behavior). In particular,
studies have found that bullying and being bullied are strongly associated with
involvement in physical fights and carrying weapons to school. See id. at 348-49
(explaining connection between bullying and future violent behavior). Bullying
can also be a marker for a variety of serious violent behaviors, including frequent
fighting, fighting-related injury, and weapon carrying. See id. (concluding based
on substantive research that bullying increases propensity for future violent activities and behaviors).
50. Fox ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (citing research indicating correlation between youth bullying and later criminal activity or convictions); see also Ctr. for the
Study and Prevention of Violence, Olweus Bullying Prevention Program (BPP),
(noting that
http://colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/modelprograms/BPP.html
children who bully are 37% more likely to commit offenses as adults) (last visited
May 17, 2010).
51. See Fox ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
52. See, e.g., van der Wal et al., supra note 44, at 1316 (providing statistics
indicating that bullying offenders are more likely to engage in delinquent
behavior).
53. See Julian Knight, Bullied Workers Suffer "Battle Stress," BBC NEWS ONLINE,
Aug. 17, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3563450.stm (noting that
witnesses of bullying often suffer similar mental problems to those bullied). For
further discussion of the effects of bullying on bystanders, see infra note 55 and
accompanying text.
54. Joel Epstein, Breaking the Code of Silence: Bystanders to Campus Violence and
the Law of College and University Safety, 32 STETSON L. REv. 91 (2002).
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who witnesses bullying, including guilt for not stopping it, fear of being a
future victim or losing social influence, and anger and frustration towards
the aggressor.55
These negative effects of feeling uncomfortable, helpless, or degraded do not disappear with age; even adults suffer both physically and
psychologically when bullied.5 6 Some experts have compared the posttraumatic stress felt by bullied workers to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
symptoms experienced by soldiers.5 7 These findings make addressing bullying in college all the more important and refute arguments that bullying
only occurs among, or exclusively impacts, children.

III.

LEGAL THEORIES

Because no independent cause of action exists for bullying, students
must rely on other grounds to challenge bullying.58 Plaintiffs can file harassment claims under federal statutes; however, such claims require a high
standard of proof, which makes it very difficult for bullying victims to recover. 59 Finding colleges and universities liable for peer harassment is
more challenging than similar actions against elementary and secondary
schools because of the reduced control over students in the university setting. Historically, tort actions based on bullying conduct have been unsuc55. See Jennifer L. Martin, Gendered Violence on Campus: Unpacking Bullying,

Harassment, and Stalking, in

UNDERSTANDING

AND PREVENTING CAMPUS VIOLENCE,

supra note 35, at 3, 5; see also School Violence: Prevalence, Fears, and Prevention, ISSUE
PAPER (RAND Education, Santa Monica, Cal.), 2001, available at, http://
www.rand.org/pubs/issue-papers/IP219/index2.html (recognizing prevalence of
bullying and suggesting school programs, counseling, and mediation, among
other recommendations, to help alleviate bullying in schools).
56. See Knight, supra note 53 (identifying nightmares, "susceptibility to illness,
heart disease and alcoholism" among physical and psychological conditions suffered by bullying victims and noting that bullied employees average seven more
sick days per year than their non-bullied coworkers).
57. See id. (presenting conclusions of research indicating that workplace bullying victims exhibit symptoms associated with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder). Specifically, the author cited the research of Dr. Noreen Tehrani, who conducted a
study of 165 professionals in the "caring sector" and found that one in five exhibited symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. See id. (identifying research findings of Dr. Tehrani). In particular, these symptoms included "hyper arousal, a
feeling of constant anxiety and over-vigilance; avoidance of anything to do with the
traumatizing event; and re-experiencing, in which subjects suffer flashbacks or obsessive thoughts concerning the trauma." See id. (providing examples of three
main signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).
58. See Kathleen Conn, Bullying in K-12 Public Schools: Searching for Solutions,
COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION POLICY INSTITUTE, Winter 2006, at 4, available at http:

//www.cepionline.org/pdf/Policy%20Briefs/Kathleen%2OConn-Bullying%20
VCU%20PolicyPaper%202-11-06.pdf (noting that bullying victims often rely on
harassment actions because no current state anti-bulling statute provides private
cause of action and anti-bullying statutes providing enforcement mechanisms generally leave enforcement "to the discretion of local Boards").
59. See id. at 4-5 (noting that many students and parents attempt to seek re-

dress via harassment suits but explaining that high standards of proof imposed on
plaintiffs render recovery difficult).
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cessful against colleges because of courts' reluctance to impose any special
60
duties on schools for students' safety.
Plaintiffs have increasingly, and with some measure of success, pursued tort theories with lower standards of proof. For example, several
claimants have asserted claims under state-based civil rights statutes to successfully recover against K-12 schools for their failure to stop extreme bullying.6 1 Universities and colleges should be prepared for such suits to be
filed against them and appreciate the lower standard a plaintiff needs to
satisfy for recovery. This section provides a brief overview of the legal theories plaintiffs have applied in pursuing their bullying claims.
A.

Legal Theories Based on Protected Class Membership

1.

Title IX

a.

Background to Title IX

In 1972, Congress passed Title IX primarily to help women gain ac62
cess to the same educational opportunities as their male counterparts.
Congress debated whether Title IX was actually needed or, instead, if Congress could just add the word "sex" to existing Title VI prohibitions against
racial discrimination.6 3 Title IX's proponents were ultimately victorious
and Title IX was passed, providing that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro64
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
At the time of Title IX's passage, there was uncertainty as to whether
65
In fact, it was not until the
it was intended to cover sexual harassment.
1990s that the Supreme Court heard cases pertaining to sexual harassment
and Title IX. One of the first of these cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
SchoolDistict,66 involved the alleged sexual harassment of an eighth-grader
60. See Marshall v. Cortland Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 697 N.Y.S.2d 395, 396
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
61. For a discussion of the state-based civil rights statutes, see infra notes 16675 and accompanying text.
62. See Kelly Titus, Students, Beware: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, 60 LA. L. REv. 321, 327 (1999) (reviewing legislative history of Title IX and
citing House Subcommittee on Education and Labor hearings where debate centered on providing women greater access to higher education).
63. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 663 (1999); see also
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1999) (exempting educational facilities from Title VII's
prohibition of sex discrimination).
64. See id. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a).
65. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 663-64 (explaining that when Title IX was passed,
the "concept of 'sexual harassment' as gender discrimination had not been recognized or considered by the courts" and thus concluding that "there is no basis to
think that Congress contemplated liability for a school's failure to remedy discriminatory acts by students or that the States would believe the statute imposed on
them a clear obligation to do so").
66. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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by her teacher. 67 The student claimed that the teacher made sexually suggestive comments to her and other female students. 6 8 The teacher also
fondled the student's breasts and ultimately engaged in sexual intercourse
with her.69
The Court in Gebser set out a two-part standard for holding schools
liable under Title IX.70 First, an official with authority to address the
problem must have actual notice of the harassment.7 1 Second, the official
must fail to respond adequately.7 2 The Court's interpretation of its ade67. See id. at 278-79 (describing facts and procedural posture of case). Specifically, the plaintiff student and her mother filed Title IX, § 1983, and state negligence claims against the school district, as well as state law claims against the
teacher individually. See id. (describing procedural posture of case).
68. See id. at 277-78 (describing facts of case).
69. See id. at 278 (describing facts of case). According to the record, the
teacher commenced a sexual relationship with the plaintiff in the spring of her
freshman year in high school when he visited her house to give her a book, and
kissed and fondled her. See id. The plaintiff and teacher had sexual intercourse
numerous times during the school year and continued their relationship until January 1993, when the teacher was arrested after a police officer discovered them
engaged in sexual intercourse. See id. Throughout the course of their relationship, the plaintiff did not report the relationship to school officials because "while
she realized [the teacher's] conduct was improper, she was uncertain how to react
and she wanted to continue having him as a teacher." See id.
70. See id. at 292 (holding that until Congress directly addresses issue of
school district liability for sexual harassment claims, "actual notice" and "deliberate indifference" are required for plaintiff recovery). The Court recognized that
because Title IX provides a "judicially implied" rather than an expressed right to
private action, "there is no legislative expression of the scope of available remedies,
including when it is appropriate to award monetary damages." Id. at 283-84. Consequently, in the absence of additional guidance from Congress, the Court developed a two-part standard as a "sensible remedial scheme that best comports with
the statute." Id. at 284.
71. See id. at 285-88 (holding plaintiffs must show that defendant school district had "actual notice" of sexual harassment in Title IX claim). The plaintiffs
argued that the Court should employ "constructive notice" or "respondeat superior" standards rather than impose a requirement of "actual notice." See id. at 28283. Rejecting these standards, the Court noted that both would provide for "unlimited recovery of damages under Title IX where Congress has not spoken on the
subject of either the right or the remedy." Id. at 286 (evaluating plaintiff's arguments against legislative history of Title IX). Moreover, the Court stipulated that
where Congress "attaches conditions to the award of federal funds under its spending power"-as it did in Title IX-"ensuring 'that the receiving entity of federal
funds [had] notice'" of liability for monetary damages is a "central concern." Id. at
287 (examining legislative history of Title IX and Court precedent in spending
clause cases) (internal citations omitted). Finally, the Court concluded that Congress did not envision vicarious liability or constructive notice as the applicable
standards based on its stipulation that Title IX funding can only be suspended or
terminated through enforcement proceedings "until it 'has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement.'" Id. at 288.
In view of these considerations, the Court held that actual notice was the appropriate standard in assessing liability. See id. at 285-88 (concluding based on legislative
history that Congress envisioned actual notice as appropriate standard).
72. See id. at 290 (noting that Title IX's "express remedial scheme" provides
"an opportunity to rectify the violation" and concluding that congressional ap-
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quacy requirement was arguably generous for school defendants in that
they could meet the standard without actually stopping the harassment.
Specifically, the Court concluded that liability based on this standard lies
only upon a showing that the school official acted with "deliberate indifference" or made an official decision not to correct the violation." Applying this standard to the facts of Gebser, school officials were aware of the
teacher's sexually inappropriate comments to female students and warned
him to watch his classroom comments, but did not have actual notice of
74
Consequently, based on this
the teacher's sexual acts with the plaintiff.
the school liable under
find
to
refused
Court
the
lack of actual notice,
75
harassment.
sexual
Title IX for
b.

76
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education

In 1999, the Court once again heard a case involving Title IX and
77
Instead of teacher-on-student sexual harasssexual harassment issues.
ment, the sexual harassment in Davis was peer-on-peer. The plaintiff sued
the school district, not for the other student's actions, but for the school's
inaction in allowing the known harassment to continue against the student.7 8 During the 1999 school year, Davis, a fifth-grade girl, endured
proval of "corrective action" demands that plaintiff also show school district's inadequate response to actual notice).
73. See id. (concluding that Title IX's "administrative enforcement scheme"
requires imposition of "deliberate indifference" standard because the "scheme presupposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action
to bring the recipient into compliance" or officially decides "not to remedy the
violation"). See id. (examining Title IX's "administrative enforcement scheme" to
identify appropriate "adequacy" interpretation).
74. See id. at 278 (noting Gesber failed to report the sexual relationship to
administrators). Although complaints were made regarding the teacher's comments, no complaints were made about the relationship. See id. (describing facts of
case).
75. See id. at 291 (noting that plaintiffs conceded school did not have actual
notice and holding that because teacher's offensive comments to other students
were "plainly insufficient to alert the principal to the possibility that [the teacher]
was involved in a sexual relationship with a student," Title IX liability standards
were not met).
76. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
77. See id. at 632-33 (describing nature of "student-on-student" Title IX sexual
harassment suit and defining question presented as "whether a private damages
action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-student
harassment").
78. See id. at 635-36 (describing facts and procedural posture of case). The
plaintiff, the harassed student's mother, filed suit against the school Board, the
district superintendent, and the school principal based on their alleged failure to
discipline the harassing student in violation of Title IX. See id. at 635 (describing
facts and procedural posture of case). Specifically, the complaint alleged that
"'the persistent sexual advances and harassment . . . interfered with [the plaintiffs] ability to attend school and perform her studies and activities,' and that 'the
deliberate indifference by Defendants to the unwelcomed sexual advances ... created an intimidating, hostile, offensive and abusive school environment'" that violated Title IX. Id. at 636.
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continual verbal and physical harassment by one of her classmates. The
male classmate attempted to touch her genital area and breasts, rubbed
against her in a sexually suggestive way, and persistently made harassing
comments to her such as "I want to feel your boobs" and "I want to get in
bed with you."7 9 Even though Davis and her mother complained to
school officials, the officials took no action to stop or deter the harassment.8 0 Rather, the harassment did not stop until the offending classmate
was charged with, and plead guilty to, sexual battery. 8 '
The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's holding that schools could
not be liable for peer-on-peer harassment, holding instead that a recipient
of federal funds can be liable for its own misconduct. 82 To this end, the
Court held that for a school-as a recipient of federal funds-to be liable
under Title IX, the school must "'exclud[e] [persons] from participation
in,

. .

. den[y] [persons] the benefits of, or . . . subjec[t] [persons] to

discrimination under its 'programs or activities.'" 83 Moreover, in addition
to being subject to liability for its own action, the Court concluded that a
school can be liable where its "deliberate indifference 'subjects' its students to harassment" and the harassment occurs in a "context subject to
the school district's control."8 4 Here, the Court held that because the
79. See id. at 633-34 (describing facts of case).
80. See id. (describing facts of case). According to the record, from December
1992 until May of 1993 the student verbally and physically sexually harassed Davis.
See id. at 634. After each incident, Davis reported the harassing student's conduct
to her teachers, and her mother contacted the teachers to "follow up." See id.
Moreover, Davis's mother met with the school principal in mid-May to inquire as
to what disciplinary was being taken to prevent the student from further harassing
her daughter. See id. In response to her inquiry, the principal indicated "I guess
I'll have to threaten him a little bit harder." See id.
81. See id. (describing facts of case).
82. See id. at 633 (describing procedural posture of case).
83. Id. at 640-41 (rejecting contention that government's enforcement power
under Title IX extends to liability for third parties' actions and holding that school
liability requires school itself acted in violation of Title XI). Here, the Court developed its requirement that the school itself must act to cause the alleged injury by
employing the language of Title IX, which states, "no person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. at 638 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)).
84. Id. at 644-45 (holding that school liability was not restricted to harassment
perpetrated by school and expanding school liability to encompass situations
where deliberate indifference or inaction contributed to harassment). In particu-

lar, the Court explained:

[I]f a funding recipient does not engage in harassment directly, it may
not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference "subjects" its
students to harassment. That is, the deliberate indifference must, at a
minimum, "cause [students] to undergo" harassment or "make them lia-

ble or vulnerable" to it. Moreover, because the harassment must occur

"under" "the operations of" a funding recipient, the harassment must
take place in a context subject to the school district's control.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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harassing student's actions occurred during school hours and on school
85
property, the misconduct was within the school's control.
After determining that a private remedy is available under Title IX
where the school is indifferent to peer-on-peer harassment, the Court de86
Prior Title
fined sexual discrimination in the same fashion as Title VII.
87
VII cases included sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.
Under Title VII, employers can be liable for both quid pro quo sexual
88
Adopting this
harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment.
approach for Title IX, the Court concluded that a school district could be
liable for hostile environment sexual harassment when the harassing student's behavior is so "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" as to de89
prive the victim of the educational opportunities provided by the school.
Unlike Title VII, which uses agency principles, Title IX liability only attaches if the school has actual knowledge of the harassment and acts with
deliberate indifference. 90 In remanding the case to the district court for
further proceedings, the Court concluded that the school may have created a hostile environment for the plaintiff by failing to take disciplinary
9
actions against the harassing student. '
c.

Applying Davis's Ill-Defined Standard

Just what constitutes "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive,"
however, has been the subject of much discussion. Justice Kennedy's dissent in Davis anticipated that such a nebulous standard would result in
85. See id. at 645 (applying requirement that "the harassment must occur
'under' 'the operations of a funding recipient" to facts of instant case).
86. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has defined sexual harassment under Title VII, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
87. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (noting that
1990 EEOC Guidelines included "sexual harassment" as "sexual discrimination"
prohibited by Title VII). Specifically, the Court explained that "while [the Guidelines are] not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [they] do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance," and affirmed that the "EEOC Guidelines
fully support the view that harassment leading to noneconomic injury can violate
Title VII." Id.
88. See id. at 65-66 (defining scope of employer liability for sexual harassment
claims under Title VII); see also Titus, supra note 62, at 324-25 (explaining that
Court defined quid pro quo sexual harassment as "advances or requests for sexual
favors in return for advancements or other employment decisions," and "hostile
environment" as "an environment that interferes with performance").
89. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (determining that sexual harassment constitutes
"'discrimination' in the school context under Title IX" and thus concluding that
sexual harassment when sufficiently severe rises "to the level of discrimination actionable under the statute").
90. See id. at 643 (stipulating that per Gesber, "actual notice" and "deliberate
indifference" are also required to avoid subjecting Title IX recipients to liability for
employee independent actions).
91. See id. at 649 (concluding based on record that plaintiff may be able to
show Davis was subjected "to discrimination by failing to respond in any way over a
period of five months of complaints").
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widespread problems for schools. 9 2 In an effort to help define factors constituting a "hostile environment," the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) publishes a guide to aid schools in determining their responsibilities for peeron-peer sexual harassment.9 3 The OCR guide instructs that it is "the totality of the circumstances" in which the behavior occurs that is critical in
determining whether a hostile environment exists.94 Among the factors
that should be considered in this totality of the circumstances assessment
are: "the degree to which the conduct affected one or more students' education"; "the type, frequency, and duration of the conduct"; "the identity
of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment"; "the number of individuals involved"; "the age
and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment"; "the size of the school, location of the incidents, and context in
which they occurred"; and "other incidents at the school."9 5 These guidelines, although helpful, illustrate the problem schools and courts face with
Title IX lawsuits. Specifically, these factors must be examined on a case-bycase basis and what may qualify as a hostile environment at one school may
not be actionable at another.96 Unfortunately, a bright line test in this
area of law is impractical.
d.

Application to College Students

Although Gebser and Davis involved elementary and secondary students, the principles established in these decisions apply to college students as well.9 7 Specifically, the elements set forth in Gebser and Davis are
92. See id. at 654-85 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (expressing concern with majority's "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" standard). In particular, the dissent, comprised of Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and
Justice Thomas, explained that, "[t]he majority's opinion purports to be narrow,
but the limiting principles it proposes are illusory. The fence the Court has built is
made of little sticks, and it cannot contain the avalanche of liability now set in
motion." Id. at 657 (arguing that majority's holding expands school liability in
harassment cases beyond that envisioned by Congress).
93. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't. of Educ., Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third
Parties (Mar. 13, 1997), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar
01.html (containing sexual harassment guidelines published by Office for Civil
Rights that examines, among other things, situations for which schools may be
found liable for hostile environment harassment claims).
94. See id. (articulating that "totality of the circumstances" assessment is necessary in determining whether "harassment occurred").
95. See id. (stipulating that assessment of hostile environment setting requires
consideration of subjective and objective elements, and examining factors pertinent to thorough assessment) (internal citations omitted).
96. See id.
97. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (noting that Davis standard is "sufficiently flexible" to allow both grade schools and universities to exercise appropriate "degree of
control over its students"); see also Martha McCarthy & Suzanne Eckes, Sexual Harassment, in CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN HIGHER EDUCATION LAw 277, 282 (Joseph
Beckman & David Dagley ed., 2005) (explaining that standards enunciated in
Gebser and Davis apply to higher education students).
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all required in the college setting: (1) school control; (2) actual knowledge; (3) deliberate indifference; (4) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment; and (5) occurrence of the harassment under an
educational program or facility. However, these elements may be even
98
more formidable barriers for college students than for K-12 students.
i.

Control

Peer harassment claims will be successful only when the school "exercises substantial control over both harasser and the context in which the
99
Obviously, elementary and secondary
known harassment occurs."
students than do colleges and univertheir
over
schools have more control
00
As a result, peer harassment-based claims have not been particusities.
1 01
That is not to say that
larly common among higher education students.
can exercise concollege
the
which
in
situations
courts never find factual
System of
University
of
the
Regents
of
v.
Board
trol. For example, in Williams
102
student
of
Georgia
a
University
that
found
Circuit
the Eleventh
Georgia,
her
dismiss
to
motion
defendants'
the
withstand
alleged facts sufficient to
03
WilIn
harassment.
sexual
student-on-student
Title IX claim based on
basketball
UGA
a
Cole,
Tony
with
sex
liams, the plaintiff had consensual
04
Cole did not tell the plaintiff, however, that a
player in his dorm room.
football player was in his closet during the encounter and that the two had
previously agreed that the football player would sexually assault the plain10 5
While the football player
tiff after she and Cole finished having sex.
Cole also called
plaintiff,
sexually assaulted and attempted to rape the
plaintiff and
the
raping
gang
were
other male students to tell them they
her.' 06 In
raped
and
his
room
watched as one of these individuals entered
her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that university officials knew Cole had
98. For a discussion of how the Gesber and Davis Title IX liability requirements
apply in the college setting, see infra notes 99-138 and accompanying text.
99. Davis, 526 U.S. at 668 (Kennedy,J., dissenting) (explaining level of school
control required in majority opinion for school liability).
100. See McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 97, at 288 (noting that universities exercise less control over student population than at K-12 levels).
101. See id. (explaining that because Davis required "control" as element of
school liability and because universities exercise less control over their student
body, fewer harassment claims result at higher education level).
102. 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
103. See id. at 1290-91 (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
104. See id. at 1288 (describing facts of case). The record indicated that Cole
called the plaintiff around 9:00 p.m. on January 14, 2002 and invited her to come
to his room in the student-athletes dormitory. See id. Cole and the plaintiff engaged in consensual sex shortly after she arrived to his room. See id.
105. See id. (describing facts of case). Cole went to the bathroom after having
sex with the plaintiff. See id. When Cole exited the room, the football player
"emerged from the closet naked" and sexually assaulted and attempted to rape the
plaintiff. See id.
106. See id. (describing facts of case). According to the record, Cole encouraged the individual who raped the plaintiff to do so. See id.
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a history of sexual abuse charges, but still recruited him to the university
and failed to inform him of the school's sexual harassment policies.1 07
Upholding the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the
Eleventh Circuit specifically considered the issue of school control, stating:
[b]y placing Cole in a student dormitory and failing to supervise
him in any way or to inform him of their expectations of him
under the applicable sexual harassment policy, UGA and UGAA
substantially increased the risk faced by female students at UGA
....
Even though "[a] university might not .. . be expected to
exercise the same degree of control over its students that a grade
school would enjoy," UGA and UGAA exercised almost no control over Cole, even though they knew about his past sexual
misconduct.108
ii.

Actual Knowledge

Establishing that the school exercised control, however, presents only
one of many obstacles a plaintiff must overcome. The levels of conduct
necessary to satisfy the elements of peer harassment claims under Title IX
remain formidable barriers preventing the success of most claims. Among
these necessary elements, proving a university has actual notice of prior
harassment remains very difficult. Normally, prior sexual harassment by a
different student against a different victim does not satisfy the known acts
requirement. 109 In at least one case, however, a federal appellate court
allowed the plaintiff to argue that showing knowledge of policies or practices that create a risk of possible harassment could fulfill the actual knowledge requirement. 110 Specifically, in Simpson v. University of Colorado
107. See id. at 1292-93 (describing procedural posture of case).
108. Id. at 1296-97 (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 649 (1999)).
109. See, e.g., Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 750-51 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that plaintiffs complaint included claim that school had actual knowledge
based on sexual abuses allegedly complained of by other female students, but concluding that plaintiff "failed to adduce sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find either [that the school] had actual knowledge of the sexual
abuse complained of or was deliberately indifferent to complaints of sexual violence brought by female students").
110. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir.
2007) (holding that actual notice requirement was satisfied where school had
knowledge of past sexual assaults that occurred in connection with high-school
athlete recruitment visits and school failed to remedy recruitment program). In
particular, the court concluded that a Title IX funding recipient can be found in
violation of the statute where "the violation is caused by official policy, which may
be a policy of deliberate indifference to providing adequate training or guidance
that is obviously necessary for implementation of a specific program or policy of
the recipient." Id. (applying actual notice requirement to facts of case). In Simpson, the record established:
(1) that [the school] had an official policy of showing high-school football recruits a "good time" on their visits to the . .. campus, (2) that the
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Boulder,1 1' the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the university because the Tenth Circuit found that an
issue of fact existed as to whether the university was on notice as to a pattern of sexual assault and harassment in the football program and whether
the university acted with deliberate indifference to the ongoing culture of
hostility and abuse of women. 112 In Simpson, football recruits raped a woman during one of their college visits. 1 1 3 The woman argued that the
university's ineffective or non-existent recruiting policies exposed female
students and other women to severe sexual harassment and possible as11 5
saults.11 4 The case ultimately settled for 2.5 million dollars.
iii.

Deliberate Indifference

Title IX plaintiffs must also show that the institution remained deliberately indifferent to acts of harassment. No particular response is required and liability attaches only when an institution's response is "clearly
6
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances."11 Universities are
not required to expel or suspend an alleged harasser and courts have
found no deliberate indifference where administration officials met with
the alleged harasser to discuss appropriate behavior, notified faculty members, and took measures to prevent encounters between the students,
1 17
while allowing the harassing student to remain on campus.
alleged sexual assaults were caused by [the school's] failure to provide
adequate supervision and guidance to player-hosts chosen to show the
football recruits a "good time," and (3) that the likelihood of such misconduct was so obvious that [the school's] failure was the result of deliberate indifference.
Id. at 1172.
111. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
112. See id. at 1180-85.
113. See id. at 1180 (describing facts of case).
114. See id. at 1173 (describing nature of plaintiff's Title IX claims as alleging
that school "knew of the risk of sexual harassment of female ... students in connection with [the school's] football recruiting program," yet failed to remedy program to prevent further harassment).
115. See American Civil Liberties Union, Simpson v. University of Colorado
(Apr. 24, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/simpson-v-university-colorado (describing settlement of case following Tenth Circuit opinion).
116. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (explaining that school administrators retain "the flexibility they require" unless their action or lack of action "is clearly unreasonable," and further stating that "clearly
unreasonable" standard does not require remedying "peer harassment" or "'ensur[ing] that .. . students conform their conduct to' certain rules").
117. See, e.g., Cubie v. Bryan Career Coll., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1203 (D. Kan.
2003) (noting that expulsion of harassing student was not required for school to
"show it reacted reasonably," and explaining that "clearly unreasonable" standard
was imposed to ensure courts "will continue to refrain from 'second-guessing"'
school disciplinary judgments); see also Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733,
751-52 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding school administrators acted reasonably and without
"deliberate indifference" where officials met to discuss harassment and arranged
counseling session with harasser despite deciding not to remove harassing individ-
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In contrast, evidence that might support a claim of deliberate indifference could include a failure to investigate, the absence of a sexual harassment policy, or the failure to discipline.11 8 For example, in Williams, the
plaintiff, after being gang raped by several university athletes, brought a
Title IX action alleging that the president, athletic director, and coaches
knew about one of the athlete's past sexual misconduct at several other
schools when they recruited him.1 19 The Eleventh Circuit held that this
knowledge, combined with the university's decision to wait eight months
before conducting a disciplinary hearing, indicated a deliberate indifference sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 120
iv. Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive Harassment
Even assuming the university has notice, the harassment must still be
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive for a school to be liable under
Title IX. 12 1 This standard, however, is difficult for plaintiffs to meet in
practice. In a recent case, the District of Kansas struck down a student's
Title IX claim, holding that the harassment the student complained of was
not sufficiently severe or pervasive when it involved four incidents of unwanted touching by a male classmate. 12 2 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in
ual); Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 745 (8th Cir. 2003) (determining that
school's decision not to sanction fraternity where sexual assault occurred was not
"clearly unreasonable" where administration officials met personally with chapter
president, wrote to fraternity's national president explaining seriousness of offense, and sponsored educational program for fraternity members); Doe v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (concluding school did not act
with "deliberate indifference" where school officials explained seriousness of alleged sexual harassment offense to harasser and instructed him not "repeat the
behavior that made the child accuse him of abuse").
118. See Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 261-63 (6th
Cir. 2000) (surveying relevant case law including Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, Murrell v. School District No. 1, and Willis v. Brown University to identify
factors that may render schools liable based on "deliberate indifference").
119. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282,
1292-93 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing district court's finding that school knew of athlete's sexual misconduct when athlete was recruited, and holding that plaintiffs
Title IX claims alleging "actual notice" should not have been dismissed because
such knowledge can constitute actual notice).
120. See id. at 1296-97 (holding that school's knowledge of athlete's past sexual misconduct, failure to supervise athlete in dormitory or inform him of sexual
harassment policy, and significant delay in conducting disciplinary hearing
amounted to facts sufficient to constitute Title IX claim and possible showing of
"deliberate indifference").

121. For a discussion of the "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" standard, as well as a review of the case in which the standard was adopted, see supra
notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
122. See Cubie, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04 (analyzing scope of "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" standard and concluding that alleged conduct did
not create a "hostile environment" as required for Title IX actions). In particular,
the court noted that the severe and pervasive standard demands that the conduct
"must be so extreme that it interfered with or altered the conditions of [the plaintiff's] school environment, so that she was denied access to an educational oppor-
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Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology 23 refused to find incidents of

inappropriate touching-one on the shoulder and one on the breast-to
be severe. 124 In actuality there were twelve incidents of harassment, but
the court refused to consider them because the student reported only
two.1 25
v.

Educational Program or Activity

Finally, Title IX claims require that the harassment occur under an
educational program or activity and have the "systemic effect" of depriving
plaintiffs of access to educational opportunities.' 2 6 This requirement may
be more heavily disputed in a university setting than in elementary or secondary schools because most of the alleged harassment in the latter setting occurs "during the school hours and on school grounds."1 2 7 The
issue becomes more complicated when the alleged harassment occurs
outside of the classroom or off of campus. 128 The university's liability in
these cases may turn on the extent to which the off-campus incidents cre-

ate a hostile environment within the institution. 129
tunity or benefit." Id. at 1204. Here, the court held that four incidents of
touching-three times on the back or neck and once on the thigh-for a few
seconds, failed to establish a hostile environment. See id. at 1203 (describing facts
of case).
123. No. 98-3561, 1999 WL 528169, at *1-2 (7th Cir. July 21, 1999).
124. See id. at *1 (concluding that harassment is characterized as "severe" if it
is "repeated" and has "a 'systemic effect'" on harassed student). With respect to
the Title IX claim requirement that the harassment "can be said to deprive the
victim of access to the educational opportunities and benefits provided by the
school," the plaintiff alleged that her complaint met this standard because "she
received 'unfair grades' in retaliation for her complaints." See id. at *1-2 (detailing
Title IX claim requirements and describing facts of case). The court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion, based on evidence that her grades dropped on a variety of
legitimate grounds, including grammar mistakes. See id. at *2 (describing facts of
case).
125. See id. at *1 (affirming requirement of "actual notice" to school in Title
IX claims and therefore concluding that incidents of harassment must be
reported).
126. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652-53 (1999)
(holding that school must have control over student when harassment occurs and
harassment must prove severe enough to cause "systemic effect" reducing equal
educational rights).
127. See id. at 646 (explaining that elementary and secondary schools are
often able to exercise greater control over situations in which harassment occurs).
128. See, e.g., Ostrander v. Duggan, 341 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
university not liable where assault occurred at off-campus house and was not part
of educational program).
129. See Candrell v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (articulating that Title IX liability is possible where off-campus
harassment caused plaintiff to fear being on campus). To this end, the court specifically noted that "[c]ourts frequently have upheld sexual harassment claims
under Title IX where some or all of the alleged misconduct occurred off campus"
but "the off campus incidents had created a hostile environment in the institution." Id.
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Overall Application to College Students

Analyzing these cases as a whole, it appears that courts are still reluctant to find universities and colleges liable under Title IX for peer harassment unless plaintiffs can show a pervasive campus culture of harassment
that is ignored by campus officials. Despite this general reluctance, courts
are particularly willing to find universities and colleges liable for subsets of
students, such as athletes, whom they have or should have more control
over than other college students.1 3 0
Extending this liability to students who are not part of such a subset
presents a more difficult challenge-though not impossible. For example,
in an interesting case not involving athletes, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut allowed a Title IX claim to go forward against Yale University for inadequately responding to a female student's complaints regarding an alleged incident of sexual assault by
another student.1 3 1 Unlike other Title IX cases, the issue in this case did
not concern liability for the alleged rape itself because the university did
not receive notice of the harassing behavior until after it had occurred.13 2
Instead, the plaintiff complained that Yale acted with deliberate indifference when it failed to provide her with academic and residential accommodations following the rape and up until the time the grievance
procedures were completed.' 3 3
The court held that the plaintiff raised an issue of material fact with
respect to the severity of the harassment based on its conclusion that a
reasonable jury "could conclude that further encounters, of any sort, between a rape victim and her attacker could create an environment sufficiently hostile to deprive the victim of access to educational opportunities
provided by a university." 3 4 The court questioned whether the minimal
efforts made by Yale to protect the plaintiff from further harassment violated Title IX.13 5 The critical question left for the District Court to resolve
in assessing this question was whether Yale's actions caused the student to
130. For a discussion of cases in which federal appellate courts have found
schools liable for harassment of other students by student athletes, see supra notes
102-08, 110-14, and accompanying text.
131. See Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. Civ.A. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1563424, at *4
(D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003) (holding plaintiffs Title IX complaint should not be
dismissed where facts indicate university failed to respond to plaintiffs needs after
being harassed by fellow student).
132. See id. at *1-2 (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
133. See id. (describing facts and procedural posture of case).
134. Id. at *3 (concluding that possibility of "further encounters" between
plaintiff and attacker could create hostile environment for plaintiff on campus,
and holding that university's awareness of this fact could potentially constitute "actual notice" and satisfy first Title IX requirement in Davis).
135. See id. at *5 (explaining that finding should be made regarding whether
university's minimal actions constituted "clear unreasonable [ness]").
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13 6
Here, the plaintiff
"undergo harassment or make her vulnerable to it."
of the "disbecause
accommodations
residential
and
requested academic
her
encountered"
she
if
feel
would
she
comfort and fear that
1 37
perpetrator.
The discomfort and fear experienced by rape victims also exists, per38
Plaintiffs may argue, therehaps to a lesser degree, in victims of bullies.'
fore, that this case be expanded to find liability when universities and
colleges make minimal efforts to protect against future bullying after the
bullying has been investigated and verified by the administration. Courts
and college administrators need to understand the substantial and detrimental effects that severe, pervasive bullying can have in depriving students of educational opportunities.

2.

Section 1983 Suits

Because Title IX allows suits only against school districts, students may
also want to bring Section 19831' actions against individuals based on
140
During the 2008Title IX, due process, or equal protection violations.
2009 term, the Supreme Court settled a longstanding circuit split by deciding that Title IX is not the sole remedy for sex discrimination in
schools.141 Moreover, the Court concluded that Title IX does not pre42
Even if the Secempt Section 1983 constitutional and statutory claims.1
tion 1983 claims are procedurally allowed to survive, however, plaintiffs
traditionally fare no better with Section 1983 due process actions than
with Title IX actions because of enormous substantive barriers implicit in
each.' 4 3 Specifically, because the Due Process Clause does not normally
136. Id. at *4 (noting that university's action or lack of action is "actionable"
under Title IX if school's "deliberate indifference" caused or created environment
of harassment).
137. Id.
138. See Stig Berge Matthiesen & Stale Einarsen, PsychiatricDistress and Symptoms ofPTSD Among Victims of Bullying at Work, 32 BRIT. J. GUIDANCE & COUNSELLING
334, 348 (2004), available at http://www.student.uib.no/People/pspsm/
documents/Bullying-PTSD-2004-Matthiesen-Einarsen.pdf.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
140. See Conn, supra note 58, at 5 (surveying remedies available to harassed
and/or bullied students).
141. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 792 (2009) (defining question presented as whether Title XI precludes action under § 1983 and
concluding that it does not).
142. See id. at 796 (holding that "comparison of the substantive rights and
protections guaranteed under Title IX and under the Equal Protection Clause
lends . .. support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to preclude" or supersede § 1983 claims).
143. See Paul M. Secunda, At The Crossroads of Title IX and a New "IDEA": Why
Bullying Need Not Be "A Normal Part of Growing Up" for Special Education Children, 12
DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2005) (describing current legal remedies as "woefully inadequate" for harassment victims due to high burdens required in each).
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require states to protect their citizens,14 4 students generally need to qualify for one of two exceptions: (1) the school has a special relationship with
the student, or (2) the school created the danger. 145
Fitting within the special relationship or state created danger exceptions remains difficult for plaintiffs. 146 For example, the Eastern District
of Virginia dismissed a female student's complaint of sexual harassment
because she failed to fit within either exception. 14 7 The plaintiff in the
case endured constant offensive remarks and unwelcome sexual advances
that eventually caused her to be hospitalized for suicidal depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and anorexia. 148 Throughout the harassment,
the plaintiffs teachers did little to address the situation despite being informed of the harassment, and only after the plaintiff was hospitalized
were the offending boys suspended. 14 9 Upon her return to school, the
harassment continued and eventually forced the plaintiff to withdraw from
school and begin homeschooling.15 0 She sued the school for failing to
take prompt action and prevent the harassment.1 5 1
144. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,

197 (1989) (concluding that "[a] State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause").
145. See Secunda, supra note 143, at 26-27.
146. See Stevenson v. Martin County Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 644, 648
(E.D.N.C. 1999) (explaining that precedent dictates presence of no special relationship between students and schools, and noting that "[a]n affirmative duty only
arises [between the state and student] when 'the state has exercised its power so as
to render an individual unable to care for himself or herself") (quoting J.0. v.
Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990)).
147. See Shores v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., No. Civ.A. 04-1325, 2005 WL
2071730, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 26, 2005) (concluding plaintiff did not qualify within
exceptions and school was not liable). Specifically, the court found in relevant
part that, "(1) [the school district] ha[d] no liability for the sexual harassment
which [plaintiff] experienced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a bodily integrity claim because [it] did not perpetrate the acts of harassment and there was
no special relationship between [the plaintiff] and [the school district]." Id.
148. See id. at *1 (describing facts of case).
149. See id. (describing facts of case). According to the record, the plaintiff
and her sister reported the harassment to the plaintiffs teacher. See id. The
teacher allowed the plaintiff to move her seat, but when the harassing students
moved their seats closer to the plaintiffs seat, the teacher took no further action.
See id. In addition, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the school guidance
counselor, but this effort also failed to stop the harassing students. See id. Rather,
disciplinary action was not taken against both harassing students until the plaintiff
was hospitalized. See id.
150. See id. (describing facts of case). The plaintiff returned on a half-day
schedule after being hospitalized, but was still subjected to harassment in the hallways of the school by the two offending boys. See id. at *1-2. Consequently, the
plaintiff decided to permanently withdraw. See id. at *2.
151. See id. (describing procedural posture of case). In particular, the plaintiffs complaint alleged that the school was "deliberately indifferent to the harassment which she experienced and because they failed to promptly take any action
to aid [the plantiff] and to prevent harassment," it should be held liable under
§ 1983. Id.
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In dismissing the victim's Section 1983 claim, the court noted that the
school district did not engage in conduct that resulted in the violation of
2
Moreover, the court refused to find that the
the plaintiffs rights.1 5
school-student relationship satisfied the special relationship exception, de15 3
The court
spite the fact that the plaintiff was required to attend school.
held that even though the school could have taken more timely or effective measures to prevent the harassment, "the state [was not] constitution15 4
Finding a special
ally liable for all acts of violence between students."
relationship with a college student would prove more difficult because
compulsory attendance laws have no relevance.
The court also refused, in this case, to accept that the state created a
danger in violation of Section 1983.155 The state-created danger exception requires a showing of a school's conduct that is "so intentional or
1 5 6 Therefore,
reckless that it shocks the conscience of federal judges."
although the school's efforts may have been inefficient, they did not rise
57
to a level of deliberate indifference.1
As to Section 1983 claims based on equal protection violations, the
framework depends on whether the defendant is an educational institution or an individual. To find a school liable, the school must either have
152. See id. at *3 (holding school district not liable under § 1983 claim because "[the] Plaintiff did not allege that teacher harassed her and state actors are
not liable under § 1983 if they did not perform the conduct that resulted in the
alleged violation of the plaintiffs rights").
153. See id. (rejecting plaintiffs notion of student-school special relationship
and dismissing plaintiffs § 1983 claim because exception was not satisfied). In
arriving at its conclusion that a special relationship did not exist between the plaintiff and school, the court relied on the Supreme Court's definition of "special relationship" as being formed
[w]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs .

.

. it trans-

gresses the substantive limits on state action set by . .. the Due Process
Clause.
Id. Consequently, because a student is not in "physical custody and, along with
parental help, is able to care for his basic human needs," no special relationship
exists. Id. at *3-4 (applying special relationship definition to school-student
relationship).
154. Id. at *4 (concluding that although additional measures could have been
taken, there was no constitutional violation based on established precedent).
155. See id. (articulating that § 1983 is subject to "state-created danger exception" wherein the "state has to take some affirmative steps" for exception to be
satisfied).
156. Id. (explaining that "state-created danger exception" requires "deliberative indifference" by school and noting that this "is a very high standard to meet).
Specifically, the court clarified that "[f] iability does not arise when the state stands
by and does nothing in the face of danger" and "[flailing to protect an individual
from danger caused by a third party does not implicate the state in the harm." Id.
(commenting on parameters of state-created danger exception).
157. See id. (concluding that although school could have been more proactive
in terminating harassment of plaintiff, school's conduct did not meet requisite
standard of state-created danger).
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an official policy or custom allowing employees to engage in sexual harassment, or the harassment must be the result of an action by an official with
final policymaking authority.' 5 8 To find an individual liable, courts require a showing that the individual was deliberately indifferent to known
sexual harassment.1 5 9
Although the standard for Section 1983 claims based on equal protection violations is relatively high, in a landmark case for gay and lesbian
youth, the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could maintain his equal
protection claims even though his substantive due process rights were not
violated. 160 The case involved the harassment and physical abuse of a homosexual boy throughout middle school and high school. 1 61 Classmates
regularly called the plaintiff a "faggot" and subjected him to various forms
of physical abuse, including a mock rape.1 6 2 School officials responded to
the plaintiffs complaints by saying "boys will be boys" and that he should
"expect" such behavior if he was going to be openly gay.16 3 The court
allowed the plaintiffs claim to survive summary judgment based on evidence that the school had a policy and habit of punishing perpetrators of
battery and harassment committed by males towards females, but refused
to enforce the same policy against the plaintiffs tormentors. 16 4
A jury
found the school officials liable, but before they could return a damage
verdict, the case settled for nearly one million dollars.1 6 5
158. See Secunda, supra note 143, at 28 (indicating that municipal liability

under § 1983 requires "an official policy or custom to engage in sexual harassment
or an action by an official with final policymaking authority").
159. See id. (summarizing § 1983 and Title IX requirements for individual and
employer liability).
160. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
plaintiff's arguments included that defendant school should be liable for "enhanc[ing] his risk of harm . . . because their policies encouraged a climate in
which he suffered harm" and agreeing that "defendants could be liable under a
due process theory if [the plaintiff] could show that the defendants created a risk
of harm, or exacerbated one").
161. See id. at 449 (describing facts of case).
162. See id. at 451 (describing facts of case).
163. See id. (describing facts of case).
164. See id. at 455 (describing facts and evidence of case). According to the
record, the defendants acknowledged that they "aggressively punished male-onfemale battery and harassment." Id. Although the defendants contended that they
pursued harassment of the plaintiff as vigorously as male-on-female battery, the
plaintiff presented evidence to support his claim that the investigation and punishment for his offenders was not as aggressive. See id. (describing facts of case). Consequently, the court rejected the defendants' motion for summary judgment
because this question was one of "credibility for the fact-finder." See id. (explaining
decision to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment in connection with
plaintiff's argument that school enhanced his risk of harm).

165. See Lambda Legal, Nabozny v. Podlesny, http://www.lambdalegal.org/

ourwork/in-court/cases/nabozny-v-podlesny.html (last visited May 17, 2010) (summarizing outcome of case); see also Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324
F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing plaintiffs § 1983 claim alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation to proceed and rejecting defendant's request
for summary judgment based upon presence of "sufficient evidence for the jury to
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State Civil Rights Laws

Because of the stringent requirements associated with federal harassment statutes, some plaintiffs have opted to use state civil rights laws as a
basis for bullying suits. The NewJersey Supreme Court recently remanded
a case clarifying that Title IX's deliberate indifference standard did not
apply to New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination (LAD).166 This case involved a student's persistent and severe harassment from elementary
67
school through high school based on his perceived sexual orientation.'
The student endured all types of homosexual epithets ("gay," "homo,"
68
Eventually, the
"butt boy," "fudge packer"), as well as physical violence.'
169
student changed high schools to avoid his tormentors.
The Administrative LawJudge (ALJ) that heard the student's case applied Title IX's standards and dismissed the case, finding that the school
170
The Director of the Dividistrict did not act deliberately indifferent.
and awarded the plaintiff
decision
ALJ's
sion on Civil Rights rejected the
have known about the
should
or
damages, stating that the school knew
171
The appellate court
it.
stop
to
actions
harassment and failed to take
school district petithe
which
after
part,
in
affirmed in part and reversed
civil rights statute
the
of
whether
tioned for certification on the question
standard of liabilwhat
and
harassment
provided a cause of action for peer
72
claim.1
ity applies to such a
The New Jersey Supreme Court held the statute did allow a cause of
action for peer harassment based on the statute's "plain language, its
broad remedial goal, and the prevalent nature of peer sexual harassment."17 3 The court also refused to accept the school's argument that the
174
The court differentiated
standard of liability should mirror Title IX.
grounded in Congress's
was
IX
Title
that
noting
by
LAD
from
IX
Title
infer that defendants acted with deliberate indifference" where plaintiffs harassed
for years and school failed to "enforce ... policies to protect them"); Montgomery
v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1098 (D. Minn. 2000) (rejecting
motion to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claim).
166. See L.W. v. Toms River Reg'l Schs. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 548 (N.J.
2007) (rejecting deliberate indifference standard).
167. See id. at 539-544 (stating that student was verbally taunted since fourth
grade, was molested and faced physical aggression in middle school, and eventually transferred high schools due to continued harassment).
168. See id. at 539, 541, 543. "The remarks were so frequent in seventh grade
that L.W. testified that '[i]f I ma[d]e it through a day without comments, I was
lucky.'" Id. at 541.
169. See id. at 543.
170. See id. at 544.
171. See id.

172. See id. at 545.
173. Id. at 547.
174. See id. at 548.
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Spending Power and that the scope of the two statutes substantially
differed.' 7 5
4.

State School Anti-Bullying Laws

Thirty-six states now have anti-bullying laws, with ten being passed in
the last two years. 1 7 6 Unfortunately, these statutes vary widely with many
failing to include necessary components, thus limiting their effectiveness.1 7 7 Many anti-bullying statutes are too deferential to the decisionmaking powers of local school authorities in defining bullying and fashioning remedies for violating the anti-bullying policy.' 7 8 In addition,
none of these statutes allow for a private cause of action.' 7 9 Finally, and
most importantly for purposes of this Article, these statutes are presently
limited to students in grades K-12, and would need to be amended to protect college and university students.
B.
1.

Legal Theories Not Based on Protected Class Membership

Tort Actions

A plaintiff may try to bring a lawsuit alleging numerous tort theories,
including negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 8 0 Universities' ability to avoid legal
liability has been premised on various theories over the decades.' 8 '
Before the 1960s, universities relied on the concept represented in the in
loco parentisera to insulate them from legal scrutiny.182 The bystander era,
which focused on student freedom and universities' lack of authority and
175. See id. at 549 (noting that Title IX and LAD differed on three grounds:
(1) Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex only, (2) Title IX only prohibits
beneficiaries of federal educational funds from discriminating against students
due to sex, and (3) LAD expressly authorizes private action to file causes of ac-

tions, whereas Title IX impliedly allows private right of action).
176. See generally Bully Police USA, www.bullypolice.org (last visited May
17,
2010) (rating states' anti-bullying laws).
177. See Fred Hartmeister & Vickie Fix-Turkowski, Getting Even with Schoolyard
Bullies: Legislative Responses to Campus Provocateurs, 195 ED. L. REP. 1, 13-19 (2005).
178. See Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H. Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully:
Should Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes Be the Answer?, 12 DuKE J. GENDER L. & Pot'v
53, 71 (2005).
179. For a further discussion of the lack of private action afforded by antibullying statutes, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Complaint, Vilardo v. Daniel Webster College, available at http:/

/media.nashuatelegraph.com/assets/bullysuit.pdf (citing student's complaint of
college's gross negligence) (last visited May 17, 2010).
181. See generally ROBERT D. BICKEL & PETER F. LAKE, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERsrrY: WHO AssuMEs THE RISK OF COLLEGE LIFE?
(1999).
182. See id. at 7.
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control of students, imposed little or no responsibility on universities to
1 83
protect students from harm.
The most significant barrier to these actions is establishing that a university or college has a general duty to provide a safe learning environment. 184 Generally, no duty exists to keep a student safe from the acts of a
third party, and a majority of courts have rejected the university-student
1 85
Courts likewise dismiss the
relationship alone as a basis for liability.
a duty because college stuestablishing
as
relationship
custodian-charge
themselves.1 86
of
care
take
to
able
are
who
adults
are
dents
Today, with front-page news reporting hazing, harassment, and other
violence on campus, uncertainty exists as to whether a college or university
18 7
Although most courts do not autoowes any duty at all to its students.
courts seem willing to reconceplaw,
of
matically impose a duty as a matter
tualize the student-university relationship and find colleges and
universities responsible for student safety under certain fact patterns when
188
Successful lawsuits against universities have
special relationships exist.
been based on a business-invitee relationship if the harmful act by the
89
In addition, some courts have found a
third person was foreseeable.1
duty based on a landlord-tenant relationship or a protector-protectorate
0
Not all states, however, recognize these duties with unirelationship. 19
183. See id. at 7-8. An often cited case for this proposition is a Third Circuit
case, where the court stated:
College students today are no longer minors; they are now regarded as
adults in almost every phase of community life.

. .

. There was a time

when college administrators and faculties assumed a role [i]n loco parentis. ... But today students vigorously claim the right to define and regulate their own lives.
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 13940 (3d Cir. 1979).
184. See Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086, 1093 (Vt. 1999) (finding
that university owed duty of reasonable care to avoid harm to plaintiff); see also
Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, The Emergence of New Paradigmsin Student-University Relations: From "InLoco Parentis" to Bystander to Facilitator,23J.C. & U.L. 755, 780
(1997)
185. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 141-142; see also Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861
P.2d 768, 778 (Kan. 1993); Rhaney v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 880 A.2d 357, 364
(Md. 2005).
186. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 517 (Del. 1991) (stating that
custodial relationship is not possible because students are adults). See also Aliza M.
Milner, Cause of Action Against College or University for Injury Inflicted on Student by
Third Party, 31 CAUSES OF Ac-roN 2D 675, §§ 7-8 (2007) (stating that student may
rely on custodian charge relationship for tort liability but, thus far, plaintiffs have
not been successful on these grounds).
187. See id. § 12. For a further discussion of the extent to which universities
owe their students duties, see Bickel & Lake supra note 184, at 780.
188. For an example of when a court imposed a duty on universities, see infra
notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
189. See Milner, supra 186, § 9 (stating that courts will discern if university
should have foreseen harm by deciding whether it punished or tried to prevent
similar harm in past).
190. See id. § 10 (stating that landlords will be held liable for harmful conduct
if they knew or should have known about third parties' actions).
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versities and students; therefore, no bright line rule can be articulated regarding a college or university's tort liability.19 1
The rise of hazing litigation has given courts the opportunity to revisit
the question of whether a university or college ever undertakes a duty to
protect a student's safety. Some courts have found colleges and universities liable for student injuries resulting from third party action when such
conduct was reasonably foreseeable by the university, 192 when the university failed to investigate hazing incidents, 19 3 and when the university's hazing policy was not enforced.' 94 This area is highly fact-specific, although a
few courts recognize that colleges and universities owe a duty of reasonable care as to a student's safety, and use traditional tort principles when
evaluating the college or university's acts or omissions.1 95
In one case, the Delaware Supreme Court found the University of
Delaware owed a duty to one of its students, Jeffrey Furek, who was permanently injured during his fraternity's "hell night."19 6 During the course of
the evening, a fraternity member poured lye-based liquid oven cleaner on
the pledge's body resulting in permanent scarring.19 7 The court held
"where there is direct university involvement in, and knowledge of, certain
dangerous practices of its students, the university cannot abandon its
residual duty of control."19 8 Evidence existed that the university knew of
the fraternity hazing rituals and the dangers associated with them, and
had officially reminded the fraternities of the university's prohibition of
hazing several times.' 9 9 The court based its decision on Restatement of Torts
Section 323, which addresses the duty owed by one who assumes direct
responsibility for the safety of another through the rendering of services in
the area of protection.2 00 The court rejected the university's argument
that it had not assumed a duty, instead finding the university's policy
against hazing the basis for the duty.201 The court also ruled that the university's liability could be premised on a landowner's obligation to keep
the premises safe from known dangerous conditions because the plaintiffs
injuries would be foreseeable to university officials based on their knowl191. See id. § 20.
192. See Knoll v. Bd. of Regents, 601 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Neb. 1999).
193. See Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, 738 So. 2d 1105, 1117 (La.
Ct. App. 1999).
194. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 518 (Del. 1991).
195. See Bickel & Lake, supra note 184, at 761.
196. See Furek, 594 A.2d at 509.
197. See id. at 510.
198. Id. at 520. "'The University's policy against hazing, like its overall commitment to provide security on its campus, thus constituted an assumed duty which
became 'an indispensable part of the bundle of services which colleges . . . afford
their students.'" Id. (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336
(Mass. 1983)).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 518-19.
201. See id. at 520.
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edge that hazing occurred on campus. 202 In sum, although the court
agreed that colleges and universities were not insurers of a student's safety,
it refused to relieve them of a duty to regulate and supervise foreseeable,
dangerous activities occurring on campus property.
Bullying cases remain a relatively new phenomenon and few published settlements or verdicts of bullying cases exist. Based on the hazing
cases it would appear that colleges and universities could be held liable if
courts can find a duty and the injury is foreseeable. Student handbooks
prohibiting bullying behavior may provide the basis for the duty, much
like the anti-hazing policy did in the Furek case. A victim would also need
to prove the university knew about the bullying, similar to its knowledge of
hazing activities.
The holding in Furek, however, should not be overstated because it
appears to limit the duty to "those instances where [the university] exercises control." 203 Arguably, a difference exists between hazing in the context of a sanctioned university organization, which the university has more
control over, than a random bully that attends the university. Perhaps
courts will not yet extend the duty outside of the hazing context, but that
does not mean that they will not one day find such a duty. Culturally,
society may be shifting in that direction. The court in Furek specifically
noted that changes in "societal attitudes toward alcohol use and hazing"
seriously eroded previous decisions finding universities not liable for third
party actions against studentS. 204 The court had no issue requiring universities to comply with self-imposed standards (for example, the anti-hazing
policy), unlike many previous cases which specifically found school policies did not create a duty upon the university to keep students safe from
third parties.20 5 As society deepens its understanding of bullying and its
detrimental impact, courts may more often find the existence of a duty if
universities and colleges publish codes and policies prohibiting harassment. Hazing and bullying produce some of the same damage to the victim, and courts may determine "the likelihood of injury... is greater than
206
the utility of university inaction."
Recent cases seem to imply juries are willing to hold schools liable at
least at the elementary and high school level. For example, a Florida jury
awarded a victim of bullying four million dollars against his private
school. 20 7 In that case, a known bully broke a seventh grader's arm, which
202. See id. at 520-21.
203. See id. at 522.
204. See id. at 523.
205. See id. at 517 (discussing Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah

1986), which refused to find university liable for student's alcohol-related injury at
university-sponsored event even though she was with faculty member and university had policy prohibiting alcohol use).
206. Id. at 523.
207. See Colleen Jenkins, Bullying Costs School $4M, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
23, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2007.
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resulted in paralysis and trouble controlling his fingers. 208 As a ranked
tennis player, this had a lasting and detrimental impact on his life. 209 Previously, the victim's parents had complained to the principal of prior assaults and asked that their son be protected.2 1 0 The school district
appealed the verdict and the parties reached a confidential settlement. 21 1
In a similar case, a jury in Tonganoxie, Kansas awarded a bullying
victim $250,000, with interest and costs. 2 12 The case eventually settled for
$440,000 in January 2006 after the school district appealed the verdict.2 13
The boy filed Title IX and Section 1983 actions, as well as a negligent
supervision claim for the constant sexual harassment he endured for three
years. 2 14 The bullies called him a faggot and continually spread rumors
about the boy masturbating in the restroom. 2 15
Other suits have settled before reaching a trial. For example, five
girls in Casey County, Kentucky settled their bullying lawsuit during the
summer of 2008.216 The settlement is confidential, but it did include
monetary damages and required the school to change its procedures and
rules.2 17 The girls alleged that they were verbally and physically abused
and that school officials discounted or downplayed the bullying. 2 18 In
fact, one school official purportedly told a victim she needed to "toughen
up."21 9
Additional suits have been recently filed by more children in other
Kentucky counties. 220 Parents who filed one of the suits blame the school
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.

211. See E-mail from David Tirella, Adjunct Professor of Law, Stetson Univ.
Coll. of Law, to Susan H. Duncan, Associate Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis
Sch. of Law: Univ. of Louisville (Feb. 19, 2009 11:08:00 EDT) (on file with author).
212. See Verdict and Summary, Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No.
464, No. 04-2195-JWL, 2005 WL 2716272 (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.bensonlaw.com/bully/verdict.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010).
213. See Benson & Associates, School Bullying Case, http://www.bensonlaw.
com/bully/index.html (last visited May 17, 2010).
214. See Complaint, Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, No. 042195-JWL, 2005 WL 2716272 (D. Kan. Aug. 11, 2005), available at http://
www.bensonlaw.com/bully/complaint.pdf (last visited May 17, 2010).
215. See id.
216. See Todd Kleffman, Settlement Reached in Casey Bullying Lawsuit, AMNEWS.

coM, http://www.amnews.com/stories/2008/06/27/cas.41952.sto
May 17, 2010) (free log-in required).

(last visited

217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See Bill Estep, Casey County School Officials are Sued Over Alleged Bullying,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,

July

26, 2006, at Al.

220. See Connie Leonard, Three Families File Suit Over School Bullying, WAVE3,

http://www.wave3.com/ (search website for "Three Families File"; then scroll
down search page for hyperlink to article).
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for their child's suicide. 22 1 Suicides that result from bullying have become
common enough to be referred to as "bullycide." 22 2 As evidenced by the
many bullying lawsuits filed across the country, Kentucky parents are not
2 23
the only ones angry about how their child's school deals with bullying.
As the public becomes more aware of the nature and dangers of bullying, there is no reason why colleges will not also be named in bullying
lawsuits. For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal of a claim, which alleged that Morehouse College fos22 4
tered an atmosphere of hatred and violence towards homosexuals.
This case received national attention because of its potential to expand a
university's duty to its students. 22 5 Morehouse admits it owes a duty of
safety to its students but not "'a heightened duty or responsibility for matters of morals and virtues.' "226 This is not the only case trying to push the
envelope. In fact, in a New Hampshire case filed in November 2007, a
student asked the court to recognize a duty requiring colleges to protect
students from bullies. 227 The case, set for trial in August 2009, specifically
2 28
involves tort causes of actions arising from various instances of bullying.
Even if the college owes a duty to the student and breaches that duty,
sovereign immunity in many states bars an action against a college or uni229
Lawsuits may
versity, unless consent to sue has been expressly granted.
be dismissed because the universities are instrumentalities of the state and
are therefore immune from suit.23 0 Some states attempt to limit the application of sovereign immunity by applying a distinction between governmental and discretionary functions versus proprietary and operational
221. See id. (reporting that one student shot himself as result of school
bullying).
222. See generally Bullycide in America, http://www.bullycide.org/ (last visited
May 17, 2010).
223. See generally Raad Cawthon, Parents of Bullies' Victims Fight Back by Suing
Schools, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 1999, at Al; Jeff Holtz, Worth Noting; Parents File Lawsuit Over Bullying of Daughter,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at CT2; Martha
Neil, Bullied at School for Years, Billy Wolfe Brings Suit, with His Parents'Help, Mar. 24,
2008, http://abajournal.com/news/bullied-atschool-for-years-billywolfe
brings-suit with his-parents-help/; Tatiana Zarnowski, Parents Sue Over Bullying,
THE SENTINEL (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.cumberlink.com/

articles/2003/ 12/23/news/news03.txt.
224. See Love v. Morehouse Coll., Inc., 652 S.E.2d 624, 624 (Ga. Ct. App.
2007).
225. See generally Steve Sanders, Should Colleges Be Sued for Harboring Intolerance?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Feb. 22, 2008, at A31.
226. Id.

227. See Complaint, Vilardo v. Daniel Webster College, supra note 180. This
case was scheduled for trial Aug. 3, 2009.
228. See id.

229. See Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. 2006).
230. See Setrin v. Glassboro State Coll., 346 A.2d 102, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975).
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functions, only allowing suits for the latter.2 31 The governmental/proprietary distinction is essentially a question of fact, which makes a bright line
test for its application nearly impossible, resulting in a confusing body of
law. 23 2 In addition, some states cap damages further curtailing recovery
for plaintiffs. Finally, some attorneys may be reluctant to file a suit unless
a permanent injury exists.
2.

Breach of Contract

In addition to traditional tort claims, students may also file breach of
contract claims based on promises made by the college prior to and during a student's enrollment. This option may be the only available remedy
in jurisdictions where sovereign immunity bars tort suits. Case law supports the proposition that student handbooks can form a contract between
students and universities. 23 3 Most of those cases focus on academic issues
such as decisions involving grades, degrees, or disciplinary matters.2 34 As
one scholar notes, "[c] ourts will intervene if the student provides evidence
of a breach of a specific promise made or the non-performance of a specific service purported to be available to the student."2 3 5
Students victimized by bullies at colleges may start to bring breach of
contract suits based on broad policies prohibiting all types of harassment
contained in student handbooks or student codes. The contract prohibiting bullying may give rise to an action between the bully and the university, but not the victim, unless the victim is somehow a third party
beneficiary of the contract prohibiting the bullying. Otherwise, the university would have to make a contract with the victim directly that involves
keeping the victim sheltered from bullying. These promises could be
based on implied or expressed terms. Although an express promise protecting students from bullying may not exist, handbooks and other documents may include broad enough provisions to serve as the basis for a
breach of contract claim. In fact, a student in Massachusetts recently sued
his college for breach of contract for failing to provide a safe environment
for students with proper supervision, reasonably disciplined students, and
properly trained staff and supervisors as promised by its handbook.2 3 6
Although most cases utilizing a contract theory turn on academic issues, a few courts have examined this theory in relation to injury by a third
party. A New York district court denied Cornell University's motion for
231. See Autry v. W. Ky. Univ., No. 2004-CA-000216-MR, 2005 WL 497193 (Ky.
Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2005), affd in part and rev'd in part, 219 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 2007).

232. SeeAvallone v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Citrus County, 493 So. 2d 1002
(Fla. 1986).
233. See Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 53 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 14 (Ohio Ct. Cl.
1990).
234. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Colleges and Universities § 25 (2009).
235. Kerry Brian Melear, Contracts with Students, in

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN

228 Joseph Beckham & David Dagley eds., 2005).
236. For a discussion of this case, see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether either the university or the victim failed to meet obligations
under an implied contract governing dormitory security.2 3 7 In this case,
the parents of a student who was murdered in her dormitory room by her
roommate's disappointed suitor argued a series of pamphlets, brochures,
and other documents supplied by Cornell to prospective and enrolled students, constituted part of a contract which made promises about certain
safety procedures. 23 8 In denying Cornell's motion for summaryjudgment
and allowing the case to continue, the court refused to accept Cornell's
239
argument that these materials failed to create an implied contract.
Other courts, however, refuse to allow contract claims to proceed when
2 40
the complaint actually seeks recovery for a tort.
Additionally, mental anguish and emotional distress damages are usually more difficult to recover in contract actions because they must be a
24 1
A person
foreseeable consequence of a particular breach of contract.
must allege specific suffering above the ordinary trauma a broken contract
causes a reasonable person. 2 42 Mere generalizations about trauma are in243
sufficient to establish liability.
3.

State Generic Anti-Bullying Laws

In addition to anti-bullying statutes that focus on schools, several
states are considering passing healthy workplace bills, which would pro244
Generic bullying or
hibit generic bullying in employment situations.
"status neutral harassment" is different from harassment because it is not
directed towards a person who is a member of a protected class; therefore,
"status neutral harassment" is not currently prohibited by federal or state
statute. Recognizing the real and substantial harm this type of bullying
produces at the workplace and the failure of current laws to regulate it,
237. See Nieswand v. Cornell Univ., 692 F. Supp. 1464, 1468 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
238. See id. at 1469-70.
239. See id. at 1470.
240. See, e.g., Crow v. State, 222 Cal. App. 3d 192, 206 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (dismissing contractual claims because student failed to properly identify
them in administrative complaint but acknowledged "duck-rabbit" question when
student was actually suing in tort); Delaney v. Univ. of Houston, 792 S.W.2d 733,
739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissing contract claims because claim arose out of
intentional tort).
241. See Univ. of S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 172 (Miss. 2004) (discussing difficulty of being awarded mental anguish damages in breach of contract
actions).
242. See id. at 173.
243. See id.
244. See New York Healthy Workplace Advocates, Healthy Workplace Bill Legislative History in the United States, http://www.nyhwa.org/7.html (last visited
May 17, 2010); see also Susan Harthill, Bullying in the Workplace: Lessons from the
United Kingdom, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 247 (2008); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon
of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for a Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475 (2000).
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legislators in at least thirteen states have introduced anti-bullying healthy
workplace bills.24 5 Similar laws exist in several countries in Europe. 246
Many employment lawyers and company officials strongly object to
proposed healthy workplace bills. Opponents of the bills argue it is already difficult to manage existing illegal workplace harassment and these
bills would open the door too wide.2 4 7 They fear an avalanche of lawsuits
would result from people complaining about tough bosses instead of legitimate abuse. Finally, defending such suits would be costly to companies
and clog the courts. Legislatures appear to be listening to these concerns,
as all healthy workplace bills have died or are languishing in state legislatures. Nevertheless, proponents of the bills vow to continue to advocate
their adoption. Universities should therefore be aware of this emerging
employment issue and monitor its potential applicability to college
campuses.

IV.

How

SHOULD COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

DEAL

WITH BULLIES?

Colleges and universities need to adopt a multifaceted approach of
intervention, prevention, and enforcement to address bullying on their
campuses. Ideally, colleges should adopt these procedures voluntarily, but
legislation much like the K-12 anti-bullying statutes may be necessary for
some institutions. In particular, the legislation may be necessary for those
institutions that refuse to address the bullying problem either because
they still do not fully understand the problem or the consequences that
result from ignoring bullying. This multifaceted approach of intervention, prevention, and enforcement on campuses would include:
*

Conducting empirical research on the prevalence, nature,
and impact of college bullying;

*

Initiating programs and providing resources that increase the

*
*

knowledge and understanding of the nature, causes, and history of harassment and bullying;
Implementing bullying prevention policies and procedures;
Creating procedures for reporting and investigating acts of
harassment, intimidation, or bullying; and

245. See New York Healthy Workplace Advocates, supra note 244.
246. See Rebecca Morris, "Healthy Workplace Bill" Would Protect Employees Who
Feel the Bite of a Tormenting Boss, SEATTLE TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2008, at KI (listing England, France, Norway, and Sweden as all protecting bullied employees); see also

Sarah Morris, The Anti-Bullying Legislative Movement: Too Quick To Quash Common
Law Remedies?, 65 BENCH AND B. MINN. 22, 23 (2008) (describing various anti-bully-

ing workplace bans in Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Quebec).

247. See Carolyn Said, Bullying Bosses Could be Busted/Movement Against Worst
Workplace Abusers Gain Momentum With Proposed Laws, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 2007,

available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-01-21/business/17227991_I-bullyingworkplace-domestic-violence.
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Providing support for victims of bullying and appropriate consequences and remedial action for those (a) committing harassment or bullying, (b) falsely reporting, or (c) retaliating
against someone who reports.
A.

Research

To adequately answer the question of how colleges and universities
should deal with this problem, the first thing institutions need to do is
conduct more social science research on the prevalence, nature, and impact of college bullying. Although this may not sound like a strong solution, research and data are vital in determining the steps necessary to
adequately address the problem. This information already exists for children in K-12 and should be evaluated to determine its relevance in the
university setting. 248 Without concrete data concerning the prevalence of
the problem, designing a solution becomes problematic. Researching this
Article exposed a huge gap in the literature about bullying, especially regarding college bullying. Administrators need to give an equivalent level
of attention that currently exists for K-12 and workplace bullying to college bullying to ascertain the nature of the problem. The only way colleges and universities will be able to address the problem in a truly
meaningful way is with this concrete evidence.
In addition to this global research, colleges and universities should
engage in climate assessments of their own campuses. Specifically, colleges should investigate whether students and employees know the differ2 49
ent types of behavior that constitute bullying and its long-term effects.
In addition, colleges need to ascertain whether students and employees
know how to report bullying incidents and whether they are familiar with
25 0
Finally, although more
the policies and procedures regarding bullying.
how they identify bulreview
difficult than in K-12 settings, colleges should
25 1
lies and victims.
B.

Anti-Bullying Programs

Experts in the K-12 setting stress the importance of prevention and,
therefore, recommend developing anti-bullying programs and initiatives. 252 These are particularly important because drafting anti-bullying
policies that pass constitutional muster remains very difficult. As a result,
248. See U.S. Dep't of Educ., supra note 3.

249. See MARY A. LENTZ, LENTZ SCHOOL SECURITY § 6:10 (2008) (discussing
how to "identify, stop, [and] prevent" bullying in school settings).
250. See id. (same).
251. See Bryan Coplin, Bullying Presents Nationwide Problem: Little Research Exists
at http://
for College-Level Violence, Harassment,JOURNAL, Sept. 27, 2007, available
24
5/news/ 2 00 7 /0 9 / 2 7 /
media.www.webujournal.com/media/storage/paper
News/Bullying.Presents.Nationwide.Problem-2993236.shtml.
252. For a discussion of the most widely proven program, see infra note 254.
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developing a positive school culture and climate of mutual respect and
tolerance may be a better approach than using student conduct codes to
punish offenders. Such programs require staff training and support, as
well as a financial commitment. Consequently, programs for colleges and
universities should be designed carefully to ensure that they justify the financial and personnel investment colleges must make using their scarce
resources.
Although K-12 bullying prevention strategies, anti-bullying policies,
and anti-bully prevention programs may provide colleges and universities
with some guidance, the unique nature of the college environment-with
its residential components and the more advanced age of students-will
most likely require a different type of approach. The following are some
of the common criteria used by federal agencies to review and identify
effective drug and violence prevention programs that have equal applicability to any program designed for use in colleges and universities:
Quality of ProgramDesign
* Program goals and objectives are clear and appropriate for
the target population.
* Program content and methods address the needs of and effectively engage the target population.
* The program's underlying rationale is well-articulated, and its
content and methods are aligned with its goals.
* The program is a complete intervention, rather than a single
component (e.g., a video, an assembly, a book in the library).
Quality of Research Design
* Program evaluation includes pre- and post-testing with a control or comparison group.
* Program evaluation includes relevant, reliable, valid, and appropriately administered outcome measures.
* Data analysis was technically adequate and appropriate.
* Evaluation studies had low rates of participant attrition.
Evidence of ProgramEfficacy
*

The intervention produced positive change in scientifically es-

tablished risk and protective factors.
* The intervention reduced or delayed the onset, prevalence,
and/or individual rates of risk behaviors.
* Follow-up measurement provides evidence of sustained program impact.
Capacity for Replication and Dissemination
* The program includes high-quality program materials (e.g.,
manuals), training, and technical assistance.
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The program includes tools and procedures to monitor the
fidelity of implementation and evaluate program outcomes.
* The program has been replicated and produced similar positive results, and these replications have been documented.
* Evaluation findings have been published or accepted for pub253
lication by a peer-reviewed journal.

*

The most proven and widely replicated anti-bullying program remains
the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, named after its founder, Dan
Olweus. 254 The program begins with a survey to determine the prevalence
of the problem. Training follows the survey, which helps raise awareness
among specific teachers, students, and parents. At the start of the school
year, rules are established and teachers closely supervise areas where bullying likely occurs. Finally, interventions are regularly held with bullies, victims, and their parents. Studies have reported a reduction in the incidents
of bullying and other anti-social behavior after schools implement the
Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, thereby earning the respect of many
educators and agencies. 2 55
Several logistical challenges exist with designing a similar approach
for college students. Part of the Olweus program involves class meetings
and teachers setting positive and negative consequences for certain antibullying and bullying behaviors respectively. The expansive nature of a
college campus makes adapting such a model very difficult.
C.

Anti-Bullying Policies

Anti-bullying policies are another common K-12 response adopted by
schools as required by anti-bullying statutes. Besides setting the tone for
the school that bullying will not be tolerated, it also serves as proof that
school officials are not deliberately indifferent to the problem. Schools
need to be careful when drafting a policy because courts often invalidate
them on overbreadth or vagueness grounds. Recent litigation concerning
the regulation of anti-homosexual and anti-racist speech in the K-12 setting should be carefully followed to determine whether courts might be
softening their approach to schools attempting to curb derogatory and
demeaning speech.
Traditionally, courts have been skeptical of speech regulations rigidly
guarding First Amendment liberties. In perhaps the most often quoted
case involving an anti-harassment policy, the Third Circuit found that a

253. U.S. Dep't of Educ.,

EXPLORING THE NATURE AND PREVErTION OF BULLY-

http://www.ed.gov/
admins/lead/safety/training/bullying/bullyingpg22.html (last visited May 17,
2010).
254. See Olweus, The Olweus Bullying Prevention Program Overview, http://
iww.olweus.org/public/bullying-prevention-program.page?menuheader=2 (last
ING: FEDERAL CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING EFFECTwE PROGRAMs,

visited May 17, 2010).
255. See Olweus,

Research

and History,

http://www.olweus.org/public/

bullyingjresearch.page?menuheader=2 (last visited May 17, 2010).
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Pennsylvania public school district violated students' First Amendment
rights when the district adopted an anti-harassment policy.2 5 6 The policy
sought to eliminate disrespectful behavior to help meet its goal of "providing all students with a safe, secure, and nurturing school environment."2 5 7
The policy prohibited harassment defined as:
verbal or physical conduct based on one's actual or perceived
race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the
purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.25 8
Prohibited conduct included:
any unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any characteristics described above.. . . [including] unsolicited derogatory
remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, gestures, physical contact, stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or
circulation of written materials or pictures.25 9
Punishments for the harassment included "warning, exclusion, suspension, expulsion, transfer, termination, discharge, .. . training, education,
or counseling."2 60
A guardian of two public school students brought a lawsuit alleging
the policy was unconstitutional on its face.2 6 1 The students, avowed Christians, believed their religion required them to "speak out about the sinful
nature and harmful effects of homosexuality." 262 The students requested
that the court declare the policy unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. 2 63
The federal district court dismissed the case, holding that the policy
was facially constitutional. 26 4 The court read the policy as mirroring the
standard already codified in Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act, Title
VII, and Title IX. 2 65 The court read the second paragraph defining harassment as prohibiting "language or conduct which is based on specified
256. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001).
257. Id. at 202.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 202-03.
260. Id. at 203.
261. See id.

262. Id.
263. See id. at 203-)4.

264. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 261, 267 (M.D. Pa.
1999).
265. See id. at 626.
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characteristics and which has the effect of 'substantially interfering with a
student's educational performance' or which creates a hostile educational
Title
atmosphere." 266 This language is virtually the same standard used by
2 7
The
'
illegal.
already
are
IX, and therefore, only prohibits actions that
deterit
as
argument
court also refused to accept the plaintiff's vagueness
268
mined that defining harassment any more precisely may be impossible.
Finally, the district court opined that the First Amendment did not protect
269
harassment.
In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit refused to accept a
270
Furthermore, the
"harassment exception" to the First Amendment.
harassment policy extended beyond the scope of the anti-discrimination
laws. 2 71 Though Title VII and Title IX cover discrimination based on sex,
race, color, national origin, age, and disability, the policy in question covered "other personal characteristics" such as "clothing," "appearance,"
2 72
"hobbies and values," and "social skills."
The court determined that the policy was too broad to survive constitutional scrutiny, and could not satisfy the Supreme Court's test to deter2 73
As the policy
mine when student speech can be permissibly regulated.
test the
proper
the
speech,
sponsored
non-school
non-vulgar,
to
extended
court must use was set out in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
4
School District.27 The policy failed Tinker's test because it included speech
275
that did not actually cause disruption, but merely intended to do so.

The court stated:
[A]s Tinker made clear, the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" is not enough to justify a restriction on student speech. Although [State College Area School District]
correctly asserts that it has a compelling interest in promoting an
educational environment that is safe and conducive to learning,
it fails to provide any particularized reason as to why it anticipates
substantial disruption from the broad swath of student speech
276
prohibited under the Policy.
Adopting anti-harassment, anti-bullying, or other speech code has
proved to be equally difficult in the collegiate setting. Several student
266. Id. at 625.
267. See id. at 626.
268. See id. at 625.
269. See id.
270. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001).
271. See id. at 210-11.
272. Id. at 210.
273. See id. at 216-17; see also Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp.
2d 446, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that school district's policy was overbroad
and vague).
274. 339 U.S. 503 (1969); see also Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 (referencing Tinker).
275. See id.
276. Id. at 217.
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speech and anti-harassment codes have been struck down. The Eastern
District of Michigan struck down the University of Michigan's Policy on
Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the University Environment because it was overbroad and vague.2 77 Although laudable goals existed for the policy, the court found the policy "swept within its
scope a significant amount of 'verbal conduct' or 'verbal behavior' which
is unquestionably protected speech under the First Amendment."2 7 8 The
policy specifically prohibited individuals from "'stigmatizing or victimizing' individuals or groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status." 279
Challenging the constitutionality of the policy, a psychology graduate
student filed suit and argued that the policy prevented him from discussing certain controversial theories in his discipline concerning differences
between sexes and races because others might be offended.28 0 In upholding the challenge, the court distinguished pure speech, which cannot be
regulated, from discriminatory conduct, which is unprotected by the First
Amendment. 2 81 Recognizing the importance of "free and unfettered" discussion in a learning environment, the court made clear that speech could
not be regulated solely because it is offensive to many people or because
the university disagrees with the ideas or message being communicated.28 2
The Supreme Court has also stated that "the mere dissemination of
ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name of 'conventions of decency"'
alone.28 3
Subsequent courts followed the same analysis and subsequently struck
down university speech and anti-harassment codes. 284 This trend has continued since the late 1980s with the Middle District of Pennsylvania striking down Shippensburg University's speech code in 2003.285 Before
analyzing the particular code, the court noted that elementary and secon277. See Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 853.
Id.
See id. at 858.
See id. at 861.
See id. at 863.
Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 669 (1973).

284. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1993)
(overturning statute for being vague and broad); Booher v. Bd. of Regents of N.
Ky. Univ., No. 2:96-cv-135, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11404 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 1998)
(finding university's harassment policy unconstitutional because it was vague and
overbroad); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down code that would prohibit students from
demeaning others based on certain categories such as race, gender, and religion);
Corry v. Leland Standford Jr. Univ. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1995), available at
http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm
(overruling
speech code unconstitutional).
285. See Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
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dary schools have more leeway in regulating student speech than universities do. 28 6 Similar to the previous cases involving collegiate speech codes,
the court ruled the code's prohibition on "acts of intolerance" violated the
287
Constitution because it was overbroad.
Interestingly, after these court decisions, some colleges have not dis288
This does not
regarded their policies and others have adopted policies.
insinuate that administrators are not concerned about the policies' constitutionality, however, because many colleges and universities do not actively enforce the policies.2 89 Yet administrators still consider the policies
valuable because they act as a powerful symbol that actually affects behavior on campus and increases civility. 29 0 Surveys also illustrate that students
are willing to accept this regulation concerning their free speech rights,
with over two-thirds of incoming freshman approving hate speech
prohibitions. 291
The general population also mirrors the students' willingness to reguspeech. 292 Additionally, some legal commentators question the
hate
late
existing absolutist approach to the First Amendment and urge a balance
29 3
Commentabetween freedom of speech and other democratic values.
the horriunderestimate
libertarians
civil
and
courts
the
that
contend
tors
294
Recent cases
ble effect insulting words have on classes of people.
involving K-12 policies reveal that the judiciary's previous hostility toward
speech regulations is softening, specifically in cases that involve efforts to
regulate anti-homosexual or anti-racist speech. Judges deciding several recent cases permitting regulation of anti-homosexual speech and other
demeaning speech in high schools and elementary schools seem to understand the dangers associated with permitting such offensive speech in the
educational system.
2 95
These holdings, however, have been limited to secondary schools.
For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a school's decision to forbid a stu286. See id. at 369.
287. See id. at 370 (finding statute overbroad, and court did not analyze
whether statute may also suffer from vagueness).
288. SeeJoN B. GOULD, SPEAK No EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH REGULATION 150 (2005).
289. See id. at 175.
290. See id.

291. See id. at 176.
292. See id. at 177.
293. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist

CRITICAL

Speech on Campus, in WoRDs THAr

WOUND:

SPEECH, AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT

53, 53-58 (Mari Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).

RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE

294. See id. at 57.

295. See, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965,
967 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (granting injunction forbidding school from preventing student from wearing his anti-gay T-shirt that read "Homosexuality is a sin! Islam is a
lie! Abortion is murder! Some issues are just black and white!"); Chambers v.
Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1069 (D. Minn. 2001) (enjoining school from
prohibiting student from wearing "Straight Pride" sweatshirt).
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dent from wearing an anti-gay T-shirt to school because it violated others'
rights. 296 The court stated:
Those who administer our public educational institutions need
not tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy the self-esteem of our
most vulnerable teenagers and interfere with their educational
development. To the contrary, the School had a valid and lawful
basis for restricting Harper's wearing of his T-shirt on the ground
that his conduct was injurious to gay and lesbian students and
interfered with their right to learn. 29 7
The court heavily weighed sources that demonstrated the detrimental academic and psychological effects of student speech that demeaned gay and
lesbian students or other protected classes. 298 The court specifically limited its decision to conduct that occurs in public high schools and in elementary schools-not colleges and universities. The court justified this
distinction by noting that "young adults acquire more strength and maturity, and specifically as they reach college age, they become adequately
equipped emotionally and intellectually to deal with the type of verbal assaults that may be prohibited during their earlier years." 29 9 In another
case that upheld a school's restriction of anti-homosexual speech, the
Northern District of Illinois specifically noted that the only appropriate
context to regulate the speech would be in the high school setting.3 00
Courts are also appearing more lenient with restrictions prohibiting
racist speech. The Tenth Circuit upheld a racial harassment and intimidation policy that prohibited district employees and students from "racially
harass[ing] or intimidat[ing] another student(s) by name calling, using
racial or derogatory slurs, wearing or possess[ing] .

.

. items depicting or

implying racial hatred or prejudice."3 0 The lawsuit followed after a middle school student was suspended for drawing the Confederate Flag during math class. 302 In upholding the school's disciplinary actions, the court
refused to find the policy overbroad because the court concluded that no
substantial danger existed that the policy would be applied to limit students' First Amendment rights. 30 3 Moreover, the student's vagueness
claim failed because evidence showed that the student knew and understood the school policy.304
296. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006).
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 1179-80.
See id. at 1179.
Id. at 1183.
See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204 Bd. of Educ., No. 07 C 1586,

2007 WL 1141597, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007).
301. West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir.
2000).
302. See id.
303. See id. at 1368.
304. See id.
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Although these cases are encouraging in that they indicate that First
Amendment jurisprudence may be beginning to change to balance free
speech concerns with the protection of other rights, the most recent
speech code case involving a sexual harassment policy at Temple University indicates that courts are not yet willing to extend this approach to
colleges and universities. 30 5 In this case, a graduate student sought injunctive relief against a sexual harassment policy that he claimed chilled his
speech about "social, cultural, political and/or religious views" regarding
women in the military.3 0 6 Temple's policy provided that:
All forms of sexual harassment are prohibited, including ... expressive, visual or physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature, when . . . (c) such conduct has the purpose or

effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work, educational performance, or status; or (d) such conduct has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment.3 0 7
In holding that the policy was facially overbroad and therefore unconstitutional, the Third Circuit began its analysis with a statement that ex3 08
plained free speech's fundamental importance on college campuses.
The court specifically contrasted speech in the college environment to
speech in the elementary and high school settings by finding that administrators have substantially more leeway to regulate speech in the K-12 setting because of the "special needs of school discipline" with younger
students. 3 0 9 Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that no "harassment ex3 10
ception" to the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause exists.
Turning to the specific language of Temple's policy, the court took
particular issue with the language focusing on the motives of the
speaker.3 1 1 The specific language from the policy prohibited conduct that
had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
312
Under Tinker, speech can
work, educational performance, or status.
only be constitutionally regulated when it substantially disrupts the school
operations or creates a true threat to an individual's educational experi3 13
The
ence; purpose alone cannot be the basis for regulating speech.
court questioned whether the policy's language of "unreasonably interfer305.
306.
307.
308.

See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 305.
Id.
See id. at 315.

309. See id.

310.
311.
312.
313.

See
See
See
See

id. at 316.
id. at 317.
id. at 316.
id. at 317.
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ing" satisfied Tinker's standard of "substantially interfering," which incorporates a severe and pervasive requirement.3 14
The court also found the policy's use of "hostile," "offensive," and
"gender-motivated" problematic because the terms were too subjective
and broad. The court suggested that the general terms would need to be
coupled to a "requirement akin to a showing of severity and pervasiveness
... a requirement that the conduct objectively and subjectively creates a
hostile environment or substantially interferes with an individual's
work." 15 Without such a requirement, the policy unconstitutionally regulated protected speech.3 1 6 Furthermore, the use of the term "gender-motivated" created its own set of issues, including determining whose gender
must serve as the motivation and what gender exactly means.3 17
This case effectively illustrates that drafting a constitutional code of
conduct or speech code remains very difficult for universities and colleges.
Its difficulty causes some universities and colleges to forgo passing any policy due to fear that it will violate the First Amendment. Nonetheless, this is
a mistake because policies send a strong message to students regarding
tolerance and civility and can be drafted to the extent allowed by law.3 1 8
Conducting a study of 100 colleges with enacted speech codes, Professor
Jon B. Gould-an Associate Professor at George Mason University and the
Director of the Center for Justice, Law & Society-accurately identified
the current dilemma colleges face concerning speech codes. 3 1 9 On the
one hand, they fear lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of their
speech codes.3 20 Failing to have policies and procedures in place, however, may be evidence of a hostile or intimidating environment that could
result in liability under Title VII or Title IX.3 2 1 Gould argues that colleges
and universities can draft policies that withstand constitutional scrutiny,
and should do that as a matter of social policy.3 22 The fact that colleges
and universities can withstand constitutional scrutiny is evidenced by the
fact that only 9% of the 100 colleges he studied had unconstitutional hatespeech codes.
Until current First Amendment jurisprudence changes to reflect a
more thoughtful balance between freedom of speech rights and other
rights protecting the dignity of individuals, colleges, and universities must
be mindful of the strict parameters courts have developed concerning col314. See id. at 319-20.

315. Id. at 317-18.
316. See id. at 318.
317. See id.
318. See Jon B. Gould, Returning Fire, CHRON.

Apr. 20, 2007, at 13.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See
See
See
See

HIGHER EDUc.

(Wash., D.C.),

id.
id.
id.
id.
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legiate speech codes. Policies can regulate certain categories of speech
and conduct without violating the constitution. These categories include:
*
*
*
*

Lewd and obscene speech;
Profane speech;
Libelous speech;
Insulting or fighting words that by their very utterance tend to
incite an immediate breach of peace;
* Actions that "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school;"
* Threats of violence. 32 3

Phrases to be avoided unless they are connected with a severe or pervasive
requirement include:
* Speech that "stigmatizes" or "victimizes;"
* Speech that creates an "intimidating, hostile or demeaning
environment;"
* Speech that "tends to disturb" or "offend;"
* Speech that "demeans" a person.3 24
D.

Creating Proceduresfor Reporting and InvestigatingActs of Harassment,
Intimidation, or Bullying

College students need to know what to do if they encounter harassment, intimidation, or bullying, especially because students are entering
into a new phase of independence and may be unsure how to report or
even be hesitant to report such victimization. Reporting incidents is even
more important on a college campus because campus employees have
more limited opportunities to observe bullying as opposed to teachers and
parents in the K-12 setting. Students need these procedures to get the
help they require, and universities need this information to help them
track the number of problematic instances occurring on their campuses.
This information will aid universities in identifying the nature and extent
of the problem to provide administrators with the data they need in designing appropriate and effective action plans.
325
Universities may consider implanting a twenty-four-hour hotline.
Officials should encourage bystanders, in addition to victims, to report incidents because bystanders can serve a very valuable role in stopping a
culture of bullying.3 2 6 Whatever mechanisms colleges and universities
choose to adopt for reporting and investigating, they must be widely dis323. See Richard Kirk Page & Kay Hartwell Hunnicutt, Freedomfor the Thought

that We Hate: A Policy Analysis of Student Speech Regulation at America's Twenty Largest

Public Universities,21 J.C. & U.L. 1, 31-34 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
324. See id. at 34-37 (internal citations omitted).
325. See LENTz, supra note 249, at 330.
326. See id.
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seminated to the campus community. Repeated awareness campaigns
should be regularly scheduled and various vehicles should be utilized to
inform the campus community.
E. ProvidingSupport for Victims of Bullying and Appropriate Consequences
and Remedial Action for Those Committing Harassment or Bullying, Falsely
Reporting, or Retaliating Against Someone Who Reports
Support for victims can be multifaceted. Counseling services should
be available and offered to a victim when appropriate. 327 Additionally,
certain protective measures could be implemented, including changes in
class sections or living arrangements to make the victim feel safe. Younger
children are often paired with a "buddy" and this solution should be explored to determine if it could be tailored to fit a college environment.3 2 8
When dealing with the perpetrator, colleges and universities must
vigilantly involve law enforcement when the conduct involves illegal behavior. Normally, bullying conduct involves more than protected speech and
colleges and universities should be familiar with the laws, so they can advise their students on possible avenues of relief. For example, laws provide
protection from stalking, telephone harassment, unlawful restraint, assault, hazing, hate crimes, and menacing.3 29 Colleges need to plan how to
coordinate with law enforcement and when to involve them.
In addition to formal legal proceedings, colleges and universities can
develop their own individual interventions and positive disciplinary techniques. Colleges may consider conflict resolution measures. Peer mediation may not be particularly helpful because bullying centers upon a
power struggle and any mediation may further victimize the target.33 0 Finally, false reporting and retaliation should not be tolerated. Colleges and
universities need to develop policies detailing the consequences for engaging in such behavior and communicate this to the campus community.
These recommendations may require a college to appoint a compliance coordinator. A compliance coordinator could be the lead person for
an integrated school safety and violence prevention plan that would include efforts to combat bullying. Although bullying may be low on the
spectrum of school violence, if unfettered it can easily lead to more extreme behaviors that can erupt into a crisis situation or result in a toxic
327. See id. at 326.
328. See id.
329. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crime Laws (2001), http://
www.adl.org/99hatecrime/provisions.asp (compiling states' hate crime statutes);
Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Inc., Anti-Hazing Statutes, http://www.kappaalphapsi
1911.com/fratemity/laws1.asp (compiling list of states' anti-hazing statutes); National Center for Victims of Crime, Criminal Stalking Laws By State (2010), http://
www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB State-byStateStatutes117 (compiling
states' criminal stalking laws). An example of a menacing statute can be found in
the Ohio statutes. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.22 (LexisNexis 2010).
330. See LENTz, supra note 249, at 326.
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school environment. Proactively dealing with bullying is an important and
often ignored step in making campuses safe.
V.

CONCLUSION

Mechanisms to deal with bullying on college campuses have not been
uniform and systematic. This may be in part because little research exists
exploring the nature and frequency of college bullying. However, the research documenting bullying in the K-12 school environment and the
workplace provide sufficient data about the detrimental effect bullying has
on the bully, the victim, and the bystanders to warrant similar investigation
into bullying on college campuses.
Assuming research will confirm that bullying does not disappear between high school and the workplace, college and university administrators might still tend to ignore the issue because traditionally they have
been insulated from liability when a third party injures a student. Federal
statutes' requirements of severe and pervasive harm coupled with deliberate indifference by the institution makes Title IX and 1983 remedies illusory for most plaintiffs. Additionally, the establishment of duty has proven
difficult in traditional tort actions against a university because no duty exists simply based on the university-student relationship. First Amendment
concerns may also make colleges and universities reluctant to promulgate
any type of speech codes for fear of being sued.
Nevertheless, both legal and social reasons exist for addressing bullying on campus. Recent cases hint that courts may be willing to revisit their
reluctance in finding colleges liable for injuries by third parties especially
when colleges exercise control and have undertaken a duty. Cases involving bullying are so novel that it is difficult to advise colleges and universities, but many of these cases are surviving motions to dismiss.
Furthermore, courts analyzing speech restrictions have been more lenient
when K-12 schools have sought to curb anti-homosexual and anti-racist
speech. To date, courts have not been willing to extend this analysis to
colleges and universities, yet as societal attitudes harden against bullying
and soften toward restrictions on speech, this may change. Colleges and
universities should pay careful attention to current legal developments in
this area.
Even more important than avoiding lawsuits, colleges and universities
should develop a multifaceted approach to bullying in order to foster an
environment that is safe and respectful. Bullying may be the precursor to
more harmful and violent behavior, but even if it is not, bullying negatively affects both the victim and the bystanders in very real and concrete
ways.
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